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ABSTRACT 
It is collectively understood that the best quality science is needed to inform policy 
decisions; however, what constitutes quality science or how much scientific evidence is 
needed to make an informed decision is usually unclear. The Endangered Species Act 
(ESA) seeks to protect plants and animals in their native habitats and the use of “best 
available science” is required to make decisions regarding the listing of species as 
endangered or threatened. To date, no comprehensive study has evaluated the interaction 
of “best available science” and public and private interests in the bureaucratic decision-
making process within a limited period. In 2011, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) 
reached agreements to create a multi-year work plan to review 251 candidate species to 
determine if they should be protected by the ESA which provides a unique opportunity to 
evaluate listing decisions in a narrow period. 
For most species evaluated under the ESA, the population and range extent were 
consistently unknown, and the strong influence of non-biological variables on listing 
decision indicate that scientific and commercial data are not the sole source of influence 
on likelihood of species protection. Additionally, species decisions that provided 
estimates on population metrics varied markedly by what population sizes constitute 
protection. My results indicate that species included in multi-species Rules were more 
likely to be protected than those evaluated on their own and likelihood of protection was 
much higher for species that had been on the candidate list for >10 yrs and the public 
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directly influences bureaucratic behavior and decision quality. Other factors influencing 
decision quality interacted with workload, suggesting that under greater resource 
restrictions, bureaucrats will focus their resources on decisions that have higher potential 
negative feedback in order to avoid criticism. Additionally, the dynamics of listing 
decisions affecting public lands were different from those affecting private lands. My 
recommendations for improvement of ESA implementation include increased overall 
transparency in the listing process including what constitutes an endangered or 
threatened species, clarity in who is making the final decisions, and specifying which 
literature were the primary sources in each decision. Additionally, more funding should 
be allocated for candidate species research before listing decisions are made and 
resources should be increased for overextended regions and offices. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Policy initiation, development, and implementation is often informed by scientific 
understanding. The extent of the science-policy interaction needed for reliable decision-
making is unclear and often disputed (Doremus 1997, Pedersen 2014). This is because 
policies are social constructs that reflect the values of the societies they govern and, thus, 
science can only provide the information, not the answers (Wilhere 2008). It is 
collectively understood that the best quality science is needed to inform policy decisions, 
demonstrated by the special issues published by scientific journals as well as numerous 
national and international meetings and symposiums which focus on the topic (Francis et 
al. 2005). However, what constitutes quality science or how much scientific evidence is 
needed to make an informed decision is usually unclear. This is exacerbated because a 
major principle of scientific research is that results of study can only support a theory, 
not confirm it (Popper 1959, Lakatos 1970). Therefore, decision makers are usually 
required to make decisions with varying degrees of risk. Because the scientific evidence 
will never be certain and comprehensive, it may be more appropriate to explore which 
policy conditions and procedures encourage the best use of robust science.   
United States policy mandates are often ambiguous, allowing for more pluralistic 
bargaining (Lowi 1979, Chun and Rainey 2005) and maximization of support from a 
variety of constituencies with varying views and values (Page 1976). Vague mandates, 
however, leave more room for interpretation by bureaucrats during implementation of 
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these policies. When the subject of the policy is highly complex then interpretation and 
implementation becomes even more cumbersome and difficult (Ingram and Schneider 
1990, Matland 1995, Chun and Rainey 2005). Along with significant discretionary status 
for bureaucracies (“abdication principle”) (Lee 2012), Congress attempted to incorporate 
more strict scientific mandates in the federal conservation statutes of the 1960s and 
1970s to ensure the appearance of objectivity in complex environmental decisions but 
did not foresee the obstacles of implementing unbiased scientific methods in the context 
of imperfect science and value-laden decisions (Doremus 1997).  
Multiple policy stakeholders have the potential to influence bureaucratic 
behavior from both top down and bottom up. Legislators can exert their influence on 
agencies through budgeting, political appointments, administrative resources, 
congressional hearings, and the news media (Wood and Waterman 1993, Innes and 
Mitra 2015). Bureaucracies can also have their own political power and discretion by 
blocking information leakage or controlling what information gets released (Lee 2012). 
These situations allow the agencies to maintain a high brokerage capacity and increases 
their ability to establish environments of negotiation with interest groups (Lee 2012). 
Administrative agencies must also react to the public in situations that maintain 
prominent attention (i.e., salient) and adjust their behavior and outputs to avoid negative 
reactions (Leaver 2009).  
The Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA; the Act) is perhaps one of the most 
comprehensive and controversial environmental laws in U.S. history despite being 
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signed with bipartisan support.  Meant to prevent species extinction by managing threats 
and mediating recovery, the ESA seeks to protect plants and animals in their native 
habitats.  A rising number of species are declining because of anthropogenic changes to 
their habitat across the United States (Andren 1994, Gratwicke et al. 2012, Merritt and 
Bateman 2012). Despite implementation of many recommendations from scientists and 
policy makers over the years, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and National 
Marine Fisheries Service (USFWS and NMFS) are frequently ridiculed and litigated 
against for their decisions surrounding listing decisions and enforcement of the ESA 
(Rohlf 1991, Wilcove et al. 1993, Benson 2012).   
The ESA Listing Process 
The process of listing a species under the ESA is extensive (Fig. 1) and requires many 
steps that may take a couple of years or decades. A species listing can be initiated either 
by internal assessment by FWS or NMFS or by petition from private citizens or 
organizations. An initial assessment of the petition must conclude there is sufficient 
information about species’ vulnerability and exposure to threats. The FWS then 
publishes a 90-day finding rule in the Federal Register (Fig. 1) either declaring the 
petition not sufficient for further review or prompting the FWS to collect and evaluate 
additional information. The FWS then evaluates all the information available and makes 
a determination on whether the species is warranted for listing (i.e., endangered or 
threatened), not warranted, or warranted but precluded (Fig. 1). An amendment to the 
ESA in 1982 provisioned that a species remains a candidate for listing if it is warranted 
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but precluded by other higher priority listing activities (48 FR 43098) and the species is 
then required to be re-evaluated each year. When a species is declared warranted but 
precluded, a species becomes a “candidate” and FWS or NMFS assigns a listing priority 
number (LPN). LPNs range from 1 to 12 with lower numbers indicating higher listing 
urgency which is determined by magnitude and immediacy of threats, relative 
distinctiveness or isolation of genetic material of the species, number of remaining 
species in the species’ genus, and if it is a subspecies. Section 4 of the ESA lists the five 
criteria, only one needing apply, for determining if a species is endangered or threatened.  
The criteria are: 1) the present or threatened destruction, modification, or curtailment of 
its habitat or range; 2) overutilization for commercial, recreational, scientific, or 
educational purposes; 3) disease or predation; 4) the inadequacy of existing regulatory 
mechanisms; or 5) other natural or manmade factors affecting its continued existence. 
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Figure 1. Flow chart representing the process used by U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) to evaluate species for listing 
under the Endangered Species Act (ESA).  
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If the species is determined to be warranted for listing, a 12-month period ensues 
during which time public comments are accepted, public hearings are held, and 
additional information is requested by FWS, including peer review by selected 
individuals. Unless sufficient evidence is presented that the species should not be listed 
(e.g., elimination of threats, larger population than previously known) then FWS 
publishes a Final Rule in the Federal Register and the species assumes endangered or 
threatened status under the ESA. An alternative to the normal listing process is the 
issuance of an emergency rule by FWS or NMFS. Emergency rules bypass a large part 
of the process described above and immediately declare species as endangered if the 
agency identifies impending threats that create significant risk to the immediate survival 
of the species. Once emergency listed, the FWS or NMFS conducts a formal full review 
process. 
A common criticism of the ESA is that it is chronically underfunded and this 
impedes recovery efforts (Mann and Plummer 1995, Abbitt and Scott 2001, Stokstad 
2005b, Langpap and Kerkvliet 2010). Funding for endangered species is currently 
mandated to be allocated based on priority rank (61 FR 64475) based on measures of the 
degree of threat, potential for recovery, genetic distinctiveness, and conflict with 
development or other economic activity (Simon et al. 1995).  Some reports regarding 
species-specific spending indicate that funding is based largely on other considerations 
including funding stability and opportunities for partnership such as states or non-
government organizations (Dawson and Shogren 2001, Restani and Marzluff 2001). 
There is also evidence that certain factors including taxonomic class and, subsequently, 
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lack of data regarding population status and trends affect the amount of protection and 
funding for many species (Gratwicke et al. 2012). However, Langpap and Kerkvliet 
(2010) found that documented inconsistencies in FWS recovery spending do not impede 
the number of species recovering or predicted extinction rates, a claim that is difficult to 
prove due to the lack of up-to-date recovery plans and scarce data (Neel et al. 2012) for 
many species already protected as well as a lack of clarity regarding the definition of 
“recovery” under the ESA (Scott et al. 2005).  
Litigation prior to 1995 primarily focused on the effects of various listings on 
economic and other human interests, not the listing process itself (Baur and Irvin 2010, 
p. 17).  Increasing controversy in the 1990s led to modifications to several facets of the 
ESA including modifications to the listing process (59 FR 34270, 61 FR 36075, 61 FR 
64475) and protection of endangered and threatened species on private lands with 
policies like “No Surprises” (59 FR 65782) and “safe harbor agreements” (64 FR 
32717).  A unique conservation tool that eased a large amount of controversy 
surrounding the ESA in the 1990s was the addition of Habitat Conservation Plans 
(HCPs) and Incidental Take Permits which allows the lawful “take” of endangered 
species (ESA Section 10, 61 FR 63854).  HCPs allow for continued economic 
development while setting aside permanent protection for species in the path of the 
development, which eased tensions between FWS, environmental groups, and private 
landowners for a period.  
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By the early 2000s, both an increase in the number of species petitioned by 
various environmental groups and lack of listing decisions by the FWS had led to a 
record number of species on the ESA candidate list. In 2011, FWS reached agreements 
with WildEarth Guardians and The Center for Biological Diversity to create a multi-year 
work plan to review 251 candidate species to determine if they should be added to the 
Federal Lists of Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants by 2016 (WildEarth 
Guardians v. Salazar 2011). This provides a unique opportunity to evaluate listing 
decisions in a narrow period, eliminating variation that would occur across many 
decades and administrations. In this study, I use data from current species listings 
decisions (i.e., Federal Register; 2011 - 2014) to evaluate listing decisions for a wide 
variety of species made by the FWS under various levels of available reliable scientific 
literature, public salience, and interest group participation.   
The use of “best available science” is required to make decisions regarding the 
listing of species as endangered or threatened under the Endangered Species Act (Woods 
and Morey 2008).  However, “best available science” remains undefined in the Act. 
Several court decisions have refined the subject and provided practical guidelines (Table 
1). The Department of the Interior released an interagency policy for information 
standards in 1994 “to require biologists to evaluate all scientific and other information 
that will be used to…support listing actions… to ensure that any information used by the 
Services to implement the Act is reliable, credible, and represents the best scientific and 
commercial data available” (USFWS and NMFS 1994). Rohlf (1991), Doremus (1997), 
and others have discussed the dilemma of defining what it means to be endangered or 
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threatened, in that these definitions are guided by what society deems to be an acceptable 
level of extinction risk.  However, they also point out that society’s choice should be 
guided by science. Based on these conclusions, the policy guidelines listed in Table 1 
may be encumbering accurate policy decisions.  
 
Table 1. Summary of guidelines for U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and National Marine 
Fisheries Service imposed by the courts in the context of “best scientific data available” 
under the Endangered Species Act (ESA; Baur and Irvin 2010). 
Agencies may not manipulate their decisions by unreasonably relying on certain  
        sources to the exclusion of others 
Agencies may not disregard scientifically superior evidence 
Relatively minor flaws in scientific data do not render the information unreliable 
Agencies must use the best data available, not the best data possible 
Agencies may not insist on conclusive data in order to make a decision 
Agencies are not required to conduct independent research to improve the pool of  
        available data 
Agencies must rely on even inconclusive or uncertain information if that is the best  
        available at the time of the decision 
Agencies must manage and consider the data in a transparent administrative process 
 
To date, no comprehensive study has evaluated the interaction of “best available 
science” and public and private interests in the bureaucratic decision-making process 
within a limited period. In this dissertation, it is my goal to summarize the listing process 
and the important factors that influence listing decisions under the ESA as well as the 
circumstances which encourage the most appropriate use of reliable science. I begin by 
summarizing characteristics, both biological and in general, of recent listing decisions 
both nationally and by FWS region. I then determine if biological metrics or other non-
biological listing characteristics correlate with FWS listing decisions, hypothesizing that 
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population and range size will influence ESA listing decision, at least in part. I then 
assess the role of bureaucratic behavior under various levels or public and interest group 
pressure on influencing the reliability of science used, predicting that avoidance of 
negative feedback and bureaucratic workload will alter FWS behavior due to limited 
time and resources. The overall goal of this dissertation is to better understand the 
factors that influence bureaucratic behavior through analyses of ESA listing decisions in 
order to elucidate changes that could enhance decision-making conditions and, hence, 
improve overall decision quality.  
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CHAPTER II 
WHAT IS (UN)KNOWN: THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 
Listing a species under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) is a costly and time-
consuming process (Woods and Morey 2008). As of 2005, 39% of listed species had an 
uncertain population status (Stokstad 2005a).  The lack of empirical data regarding 
population status and trends for candidate species, the critical information that should be 
informing listing decisions, may be leading to misallocation of funding and other 
resources to species that do not need the support and away from species that are rare and 
declining. As of 2005, 15 species had been subsequently delisted after more research 
revealed that their populations were larger than previously determined (Stokstad 2005a). 
Additionally, delisting a species can be exceedingly difficult because of the paradigm 
established (i.e., the species is in danger of extinction and subsequent studies rely on this 
idea as the basis for their questions) once the species is deemed worthy of protection 
under the ESA, regardless of its actual population status (Morrison et al. 2012).  
A more recent example of a listed species’ population exceeding what was 
previously known after appropriate surveys methods were implemented is the Lake Erie 
watersnake (Nerodia sipedon insularum).  Federally listed as a threatened species in 
1999, the Lake Erie watersnake was removed from the ESA in 2011, citing “recovery” 
based primarily on population estimates from a long-term survey (USFWS and King 
2011). Starting in 2001, standardized surveys consistently indicated population estimates 
exceeded those set forth in the Lake Erie watersnake Recovery Plan for 4 of the 5 
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targeted populations and 5 out of 5 beginning in 2002 (USFWS 2003, USFWS and King 
2011). It is clear the snake’s population was not in peril, as was believed during the ESA 
listing process, and the resources and funding its protection has occupied could have 
been allocated towards species that are in more immediate conservation need. Indeed, in 
addition to the direct and indirect cost of listing the species and protecting it for 12 years 
(~$1 million; https://www.fws.gov/Endangered/esa-library/index.html), the post-
delisting monitoring plan was projected to cost ~$289,000 over 5 years and the plan 
admits acquiring these funds would require tradeoffs with other competing endangered 
species (USFWS and King 2011).   
According to previous data and research, the availability of relatively complete 
and accurate science is lacking in many ways, both before and after the listing of a 
species as endangered or threatened (Schultz 2008, Gibbs and Currie 2012). Very often, 
little is known about species distribution, abundance, and threats, simply because there 
has been very little scientific investigation. Historically, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 
(FWS) was guided by Congress to be cautious and provide ESA protection for a species 
when the information is inconclusive (Schultz 2008).  Many species have been 
candidates for listing under the ESA for 10+ years, and some of those species may have 
slipped beyond recovery while waiting to be listed.  For example, Wilcove et al. (1993) 
found that, according to the best available information at the time of the listing, the 
median population size of plant species listed from 1985 to 1991 was 119.5 known 
individuals, placing these populations at high risk of extinction and low probability of 
recovery because of the long delay while being listed as endangered.  The decision 
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process needs to be prompt, with or without thorough scientific data, to help ensure that 
species do not go extinct while waiting to be listed (Ando 1999).  
Previous empirical studies of bureaucratic behavior use either inter-agency (Chun 
and Rainey 2005, Yackee 2006, Eckerd 2014, Lowell and Kelly 2016) or intra-agency 
comparisons (Stazyk and Goerdel 2011, Gerlach et al. 2013, Lee 2013) to analyze how 
agency structure influences performance and relative consequences of their decisions. 
Focusing on one agency, however, can permit the control of several variables, essentially 
treating them as constants, while allowing other variables to be more easily measured 
(Meier and O'Toole 2006). In regards to listing decisions under the ESA, FWS 
employees likely face similar conditions such as issue complexity (Ringquist et al. 
2003), goal ambiguity (Chun and Rainey 2005) and, subsequently, political influence 
across regions. Therefore, I will examine the influence of variables that can contrast by 
FWS region including workload, ownership of habitat, public attention, interest group 
involvement, or political opinions. My objectives for this chapter are to descriptively 
summarize the information surrounding recent ESA listing decision and assess the 
differences by FWS region in order to evaluate if FWS decision-makers face similar 
challenges across the U.S. concerning what data is available for decisions and if there 
are regional differences in the variables mentioned above. Then I will use these results in 
Chapters 3 and 4 to help explain potential variations seen in factors influencing ESA 
decisions and decision quality across FWS regions.  
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Methods 
I collected ESA listing decisions conducted on species that occur in the U.S., Proposed 
Rules for not warranted and warranted but precluded species and Final Rules for 
endangered and threatened species (hereafter “Rules”), published in the Federal Register 
(http://www.regulations.gov/). The majority of these species were evaluated because of a 
2011 settlement between the FWS and two environmental groups, WildEarth Guardians 
and The Center for Biological Diversity, to create a multi-year work plan to review 251 
candidate species to determine if they should be added to the Federal Lists of 
Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants by 2016 (WildEarth Guardians v. 
Salazar 2011). In order to avoid potential bias of a large number of species in one 
decision, I randomly sampled one species from decisions >6 species and did not include 
species evaluated in multi-species decisions >14 because they were all Hawaiian species 
that were evaluated as a group based on threats to their ecosystem, not individual 
species.  
For each species, I collected general information such as listing decision, 
taxonomic group, category of potential threats, time as candidate species, FWS region 
and office, and number of other species in the listing decision. I also recorded the states 
where the species are currently known to occur, if it utilizes island or mainland, and if it 
is known to occur outside the U.S. during any part of its life history requirements (i.e., 
Canada or Mexico). I also determined if the species occurs primarily (> 50% of current 
range) on public (e.g., managed by U.S. Forest Service (USFS), Bureau of Land 
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Management (BLM), National Park Service (NPS)) or private lands by examining range 
maps and descriptions of their current range in the Rules published by the FWS. 
I accessed NatureServe (http://explorer.natureserve.org) for additional potential 
threats in case FWS did not list a threat in the Rule because of non-biological reasons. 
NatureServe, an independent organization which works closely with the International 
Union for Conservation of Nature to expertly assess threats and levels of endangerment 
of species, is not legally recognized but has been used previously as an indicator of 
potential for formal listings under the ESA (Metrick and Weitzman 1996, Gratwicke et 
al. 2012). I determined time as candidate by calculating the time since the FWS initially 
deemed the species warranted for full review in a 90-day Rule and the date of the 
Proposed Rule. 
 I recorded population estimates, population range size estimates, and descriptive 
location information from both the published Rules and NatureServe and I noted when 
population and range size estimates were not available in the Rule. For each species, I 
recorded the maximum and minimum population estimates and maximum and minimum 
range size estimates as well as if FWS estimated the population or range size in the Rule. 
I evaluated public attention for each species decision by recording the number of total 
news articles published by an established media organization, a metric considered to be 
an accurate metric for comparisons of issue salience (Epstein and Segal 2000), published 
online between 6 months prior and post the date of the publishing of the Proposed Rule. 
Because I did not have previous information regarding the effects of various levels of 
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public attention on FWS behavior, I divided public attention into 3 categories based on 
the natural breaks in the number of news articles for each species. Based on these natural 
breaks, I considered public attention “high” if >4 news articles were published during 
this 1 yr period, medium if 1-4 articles were published, and “low” if 0 articles were 
published. I used U.S. Congress League of Conservation Voter score (LCV) for each 
species to assess political influence differences between FWS regions. League of 
Conservation Voters scorecards rate members of Congress based on environmental, 
public health, and energy issues. Specifically, I averaged Senator LCV scores in states 
where the species occur to proximate level of “pro-land-use” (0)  to “pro-environment” 
(100) Congressional representation, similar to Ando (1999).  
Results 
I collected data on 143 ESA listing decisions from 101 Rules published by the FWS in 
the Federal Register between 10 February 2011 and 3 October 2014. Fifty-one (35.7%) 
of the 143 species were designated as endangered, 22 (15.4%) were designated as 
threatened, 17 (11.9%) were deemed warranted but precluded, and 53 (37.1%) were 
declared not warranted for protection under the ESA (see Appendix A for a complete 
breakdown of taxonomic class by decision). Of the species evaluated, 78 (~55%) have 
habitat that occurs primarily on private property while the remaining 65 (~45%) species 
occur primarily on public land. One-hundred and twenty (84%) of the species evaluated 
occur exclusively in the U.S. while 14 (10%) and eight (6%) have ranges that also 
overlaps Canada and Mexico, respectively. Of the total listing decisions, 82 (57%) came 
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from multiple species rules (i.e., ≥2 species per rule) and 61 (43%) were single species 
decisions. Eighty-three (58%) of the evaluated species were exclusively terrestrial, 52 
(36%) were exclusively aquatic, and 8 (~6%) utilized both terrestrial and aquatic habitats 
at some point in their life cycle. Only 11 species exclusively inhabit islands while eight 
of the evaluated species utilize both islands and mainland. 
FWS presented a current population range size estimate for 44 (~31%) species 
decisions and a population size estimate for 47 (~33%) decisions (Table 2). Rules for 
plant species contained the largest percentage of population and range estimates and 
aquatic invertebrate rules presented the fewest (Table 2). When NatureServe estimates 
are included, terrestrial invertebrates had much smaller minimum population size 
estimates than other taxa and birds had the smallest maximum population estimates 
(Table 3). The smallest ranges belonged to terrestrial invertebrates and the largest ranges 
belonged to herpetofauna, which also had the largest amount of variation in range sizes 
(Table 3). Of the species deemed warranted for protection by the FWS (i.e., endangered 
or threatened), I found clear peer review documents for the proposed rule 75% of the 
time. Of the remaining decisions, I could not clearly distinguish which documents in the 
docket folder were peer review as opposed to public comments for 7 (~10%) species and 
the remaining 11 (15%) decisions did not provide peer review.  The most common 
threats to species overall was land conversion, population isolation, and exotic or 
invasive species (Table 4). The most common threats to aquatic species also included 
water diversion while climate change appears to threaten species that utilize both aquatic 
and terrestrial habitats (Table 4). 
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Table 2. Total count and percentage of species by taxonomic group and count and 
percentage of Rules published by U.S Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) containing 
population and range estimates for Endangered Species Act (ESA) listing decisions 
evaluated from 2011 –2014.  
   Estimated by FWS 
Taxonomic group # of species    Population Range 
Plant 40 (28.0%)   26 (65%) 20 (50.0%) 
Terrestrial invertebrates 30 (21.0%)   5 (16.7%) 12 (40.0%) 
Aquatic invertebrates 23 (16.1%)   5 (21.7%) 0 (0.0%) 
Herpetofauna 18 (12.6%)   1 (5.6%) 4 (22.2%) 
Fish 14 (9.8%)   2 (14.3%) 4 (28.6%) 
Mammals 9 (6.3%)   1 (11.1%) 3 (33.3%) 
Birds 9 (6.3%)   7 (77.8%) 1 (11.1%) 
Total 143   47 (32.9%) 44 (30.8%) 
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Table 3. Population size (# of individuals) and range sizes (ha) estimated by U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service in listing decisions 
or by NatureServe by taxonomic group for species being evaluated for listing under the Endangered Species Act from 2011 – 
2014. 
Taxonomic 
group  Min. population Max. population Min. range (ha) Max. range (ha) 
Plant 
 
141,774 ± 682,367        
(n = 34) 
172,007 ± 824,944          
(n = 34) 
196,923 ± 1,000,821            
(n = 34) 
232,706 ± 1,008,624              
(n = 34) 
Terrestrial 
invertebrates  
1,228 ± 2738                 
(n = 12) 
155,924± 374,628          
(n = 12) 
12,453 ± 28,271                    
(n = 23) 
960,823 ± 4,159,373               
(n = 23) 
Aquatic 
invertebrates  
85,466 ± 245,331          
(n = 18) 
334,458 ± 437,205         
(n = 18) 
198,169 ± 436,629               
(n = 22) 
1,499,546 ± 4,200,236           
(n = 22) 
Herpetofauna 
 
12,758 ± 29,207           
(n = 11) 
220,508 ± 387,988         
(n = 11) 
19,138,259 ± 60,910,365       
(n = 17) 
70,208,259 ± 169,673,781      
(n = 17) 
Fish 
 
10,112 ± 21,268           
(n = 10) 
205,634 ± 394,831         
(n = 10) 
330,558 ± 618,853                
(n = 9) 
2,436,363 ± 6,224,356           
(n = 9) 
Mammals 
 
43,792 ± 47,117            
(n = 6) 
600,417 ± 468,403          
(n = 6) 
3,692,106 ± 4,193,006          
(n = 5) 
4,192,106 ± 3,894,377           
(n = 5) 
Birds 
 
14,524 ± 22,595           
(n = 9) 
20,999 ± 21,427             
(n = 9) 
6,154,167 ± 7,615,353          
(n = 6) 
127,926,667 ± 133,742,066     
(n = 6) 
Total 
 
69,682 ± 409,790         
(n = 100) 
218,899 ± 575,934         
(n = 100) 
3,379,342 ± 23,662,709        
(n = 97) 
17,687,397 ± 77,507,541        
(n = 97) 
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Table 4. Count and percentage of species by threat type and utilized general habitat type according to U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service or NatureServe in Endangered Species Act listing decisions from 2011 – 2014.  
Threat Description Aquatic Terrestrial Both Total 
Agriculture Crop or livestock production 25 (48%) 30 (36%) 0 (0%) 55 (38%) 
Land conversion Urban or suburban development; road construction 23 (44%) 51 (61%) 3 (38%) 77 (54%) 
Resource use Mining, oil and gas extraction, timber harvest 20 (38%) 25 (30%) 2 (25%) 47 (33%) 
Water diversion Dams, dredging, or extraction 41 (79%) 11 (13%) 0 (0%) 52 (36%) 
Commercial fishing Indirect effects of overfishing or equipment use 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 3 (38%) 3 (2%) 
Competing uses 
(other) 
Recreational, military, etc. 6 (12%) 31 (37%) 1 (13%) 38 (27%) 
Exploitation Collection or killing by humans 4 (8%) 10 (12%) 4 (50%) 18 (13%) 
Climate change Harm due a change in the mean or variability of 
one or more measures of climate that persists for 
an extended period 
20 (38%) 31 (37%) 5 (63%) 56 (39%) 
Modified disturbance 
regimes 
Altered historical fire and grazing patterns 7 (13%) 42 (51%) 0 (0%) 49 (34%) 
Pesticides/Herbicides Direct or indirect effects of pesticides or 
herbicides 
9 (17%) 13 (16%) 0 (0%) 22 (15%) 
Pollution (other) Contamination of habitat by toxic substances 23 (44%) 2 (2%) 5 (63%) 30 (21%) 
Exotic/invasive spp. Exotic or invasive species displacing species or 
species' habitat 
34 (65%) 38 (46%) 4 (50%) 76 (53%) 
Species interactions Depredation, parasitism, disease 8 (15%) 20 (24%) 3 (38%) 31 (22%) 
Small, isolated 
populations 
Population(s) small and relatively isolated  38 (73%) 58 (70%) 1 (13%) 97 (68%) 
Unknown/Other Other threats that do not apply to categories above 
or species decline is caused by an unknown factor 
2 (4%) 6 (7%) 0 (0%) 8 (6%) 
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Regional differences 
Most of the decisions (~33%) came from FWS Region 2, specifically Arizona and Texas 
Offices, while the fewest decisions came from the FWS Region 5 (<1%) which 
encompasses the states in the Northeastern U.S. (Table 5). Texas contained the highest 
number of species evaluated, followed by California and Arizona (see Appendix B for 
complete list of decision by state). FWS regions 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 evaluated species that 
primarily occurred on private property while regions 6, 7, and 8 evaluated species that 
occurred primarily on public land. All Rules published in FWS region 7 (n = 3; Alaska) 
contained a population estimate; however, the other regions supplied this estimate for 
<40% of the species (Fig. 2). Region 8 (n = 29; Pacific SW) provided the largest number 
of decisions with range size estimates and regions 3 (n = 9; Great Lakes) and 7 (n = 3) 
supplied the fewest (Fig. 2). Regions 1, 6, and 7 had the largest number of species with 
high public attention and regions 2, 3, and 8 had the fewest (Table 6). Highest LCV 
scores (i.e., pro-environment) occurred in regions 1 and 8 while the lowest (i.e., pro-land 
use) occurred in regions 2 and 4 (Fig. 3). LCV scores in regions 3, 6, and 7 were 
moderate (Fig. 3).  
Threats varied across FWS region, but FWS and NatureServe cited the threat of 
invasive species and population isolation consistently for species across most regions 
(see Appendix C for complete proof of threats by region). Land conversion appears to be 
a major threat to species in region 4 (87% of species; Southeast) as well as influencing 
declines of many species in regions 1 (64%; Pacific) and 3 (67%; Great Lakes). FWS 
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and NatureServe cited agriculture as a threat to a majority of the species evaluated in 
regions 2 (51%; Southwest) and 3 (67%) while commercial fishing and exploitation only 
appears to be major threats to species in region 7 (67%; Alaska). Climate change was 
listed as threat for the majority of species evaluated in the more mountainous region 6 
(58%; Mountain Prairie) and the high latitude region which ecompasses Alaska (100%), 
but FWS did not consider it a threatening factor for any decisions in region 3 (Midwest). 
Resource use, specifically oil and gas extraction, was considered a major threat for 
species evaluated in region 3 (78%) either directly or indirectly and affects ~1/3 of the 
species in all other regions except region 1 (9%; Pacific).  
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Table 5. Count of species evaluated under the Endangered Species Act by U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service (FWS) region and office from 2011 – 2014.  
FWS Region Office State Species 
Pacific (1) 
Oregon Fish and Wildlife Office Oregon 1 
Pacific Islands Fish and Wildlife Office Hawaii 2 
Washington Fish and Wildlife Office Washington 8 
Southwest (2) 
Arizona ESFO Arizona 16 
Arlington Field Office Texas 2 
Austin Field Office Texas 18 
Corpus Christi ESFO Texas 2 
New Mexico ESFO New Mexico 6 
Oklahoma ESFO Oklahoma 1 
Texas Coastal ESFO Texas 2 
Great Lakes, Big 
Rivers (3) 
Chicago ESFO Illinois 1 
Columbia ESFO Missouri 2 
Columbus ESFO Ohio 2 
Green Bay ESFO Wisconsin 1 
Illinois Field Office Illinois 2 
Rock Island Field Office Illinois 1 
Southeast (4) 
Arkansas ESFO Arkansas 3 
Asheville ESFO North Carolina 1 
Caribbean ESFO Puerto Rico 6 
Florida ESFO Florida 1 
Georgia ESFO Georgia 2 
Kentucky ESFO Kentucky 1 
Mississippi Field Office Mississippi 2 
Panama City Field Office Florida 1 
South Florida ESFO Florida 8 
Tennessee ESFO Tennessee 6 
Northeast (5) West Virginia Field Office West Virginia 1 
Mountain  
Prairie (6) 
Colorado Field Office Colorado 2 
Montana ESFO Montana 3 
Nebraska ESFO Nebraska 1 
Utah ESFO Utah 5 
Wyoming ESFO Wyoming 1 
Alaska (7) 
Alaska Regional Office Alaska 1 
Fairbanks Fish and Wildlife Office Alaska 1 
Juneau Fish and Wildlife Office Alaska 1 
Pacific Southwest 
(8) 
Arcata Fish and Wildlife Office California 2 
Bay Delta Fish and Wildlife Office California 2 
Carlsbad Fish and Wildlife Office California 4 
Nevada Fish and Wildlife Office Nevada 11 
Sacramento Fish and Wildlife Office California 7 
Ventura Fish and Wildlife Office California 3 
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Figure 2. Percentage of Rules containing population and range estimates by U.S. Fish 
and Wildlife Service (FWS) region for Endangered Species Act listing decisions made 
from 2011 – 2014. 
Table 6. Count and percentage of public attention calculated by number of news articles 
published during a 1-year period (i.e., 6 months before and after proposed rule published 
in Federal Register), classified as low (0 articles), medium (1-4 articles), and high (>4 
articles) for species evaluated under the Endangered Species Act from 2011 – 2014 in 
each U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Region.  
Public Attention 
Region Low Medium High 
1 2 (18%) 2 (18%) 7 (63%) 
2 22 (47%) 15 (32%) 10 (21%) 
3 5 (56 %) 2 (22%) 2 (22%) 
4 11 (35%) 15 (48%) 5 (16%) 
5 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (100%) 
6 2 (17%) 3 (25%) 7 (58%) 
7 0 (0%) 1 (33%) 2 (67%) 
8 13 (45%) 8 (28%) 8 (28%) 
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
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Figure 3. League of Conservation Voter (LCV) scores for species evaluated under the 
ESA from 2011 – 2014 by U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) region. 
Discussion 
It is clear that for most species evaluated under the ESA, the population and range extent 
is consistently unknown across all FWS regions. Additionally, species decisions that 
provide estimates on these metrics vary markedly by what population sizes constitute 
protection even within taxonomic groups. For most candidate species, FWS is probing 
for decisions without the possibility of knowing many of the essential facts and this can 
lead to increased agency discretion and less transparency (Schultz 2008). Previous 
research shows similar results and conclusions regarding uncertainty surrounding 
wildlife policy decisions (Easter-Pilcher 1996, Prato 2005, Schultz 2008), but there has 
been little done to address these issues in regards to the ESA. Further, the lack of clarity 
induced by the lack of objectively defined terms regarding what it means to be an 
endangered or threatened species further complicates the decision process (Rohlf 1991, 
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Woods and Morey 2008). Ruhl (2005) argued that “sound science could produce a 
mountain of relevant data of the highest quality and still provide no clues as to what to 
do for the purposes of the environmental law decision.” Therefore, in order for sound 
science to be applied accurately and effectively, there should be clear guidelines for not 
only its use in the listing process but also what it means to be an endangered species, a 
definition that is not clearly defined (Wilcove et al. 1993, Fallon 2007). 
Wilcove et al. (1998) pointed out that the largest threats to species on the brink of 
extinction around the world include direct habitat loss and invasive species. Similarly, 
my data indicates direct conflicts with competing human land use and invasion by exotic 
species threaten more than half of all species evaluated under the ESA during my study. 
Indeed, known threats to species in peril are the common denominator between them, 
and policies that confront conservation needs from the point of view of mitigating 
common threats rather than single species focuses, like that of the ESA, may be the key 
to addressing cascading losses in biodiversity. Further, current recovery ESA tools may 
not effectively address species needs to adequately lead to recovery and delisting (Gibbs 
and Currie 2012) and, therefore, a more broad ecosystem-based approach which focuses 
on threats to systems may be more effective. Recently, FWS has attempted to implement 
more ecosystem-based approaches to listing decisions (i.e., multiple species decisions) 
and multi-species management plans under the ESA have become more common, 
potentially a step in the right direction (94 FR 16025). However, the current structure of 
the ESA as well as the configuration and content of listing rules are not conducive to 
making decisions based on threats to ecosystems. The consequence of this misalignment 
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of ESA structure and current ESA multiple species (i.e., by geography, taxonomy, or 
ecosystem) focus could potentially inflate problems regarding landowner perceptions, 
public opinion, and legitimacy of decisions if FWS gives protections to species under the 
ESA because of ecosystem-level threats without proper justification of actual population 
level effects.  
Despite similarities, FWS regions and the challenges they face vary by threats 
posed to species, political influences, public opinion, public attention, personnel, and 
workload. A major threat in one region may be non-existent in others. Additionally, 
some FWS regions comprise primarily private land ownership while others are largely 
publicly owned. These differences affect the level and makeup of stakeholder 
interactions with bureaucrats in those regions, which could influence institutional 
behavior in regards to defining “best available science” in each region differently. 
Further, institutional behaviors that vary by region may be exacerbated by the level of 
uncertainty surrounding listing decisions due to lack of sufficient data. For example, 
Gerlach et al. (2013) found that collaborators (e.g., local natural resource community, 
other agencies with previous positive experiences with the source) with FWS field 
offices often influence data-selection decisions through recommendations of data 
sources and these recommendations are perceived as the safe option for agency decision-
makers to use as the “best available science”, particularly when there is a high degree of 
uncertainty. Additionally, resources, both human and financial, likely vary greatly by 
region (information regarding these details by region are exceedingly difficult to locate). 
This scenario leads to variation across FWS regions and offices in terms of agency staff 
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that comprise the appropriate expertise, training to differentiate and evaluate sources of 
varying scientific rigor, and adequate time to make the most appropriate decisions 
regarding the science that is relied upon for the ESA listing decisions (Murphy and 
Weiland 2016).  
Policy Recommendations 
Addressing the issue of uncertainty in ESA decisions is not entirely clear, mostly 
because there will always be a lack of complete data on population size and trends for 
most species. However, more funding allocated for research conducted prior to proposed 
ESA listing rules would likely decrease waste associated with listing species that do not 
need protections (e.g., Lake Eerie watersnake) and increase funding available to species 
that would benefit significantly from it. This issue is becoming more important as FWS 
and NMFS are pressured by environmental groups to list more species and the financial 
burden of recovering the large number of ESA protected species continues to grow.  
 Shifting focus from single species protections to more broad geographic or 
ecosystem-based approaches and the major threats to these areas may be the most cost-
effective way to deal with the ever-growing pressure human impacts have on species. 
For example, if we know that exotic or invasive species affect a majority of species of 
conservation concern, then it makes sense to allocate resources that would address the 
issue directly (e.g., broad-scale exotic species removal programs). The impacts would 
benefit not only current species of concern but also species and populations that may 
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become threatened in the future, potentially preventing the need for protection under the 
ESA.  
It is unclear if the ESA, as written, is equipped to handle this shift in focus. 
Congress would likely need to amend a new comprehensively written section to the 
ESA, aimed to ensure transparency and goals of ecosystem-level conservation in order to 
avoid the complications of cajoling the ESA to do something it was not originally 
written to do. The most important impacts could potentially come from modifying or 
improving other, non-ESA, policies that are currently in place (e.g., Clean Water Act of 
1972, local zoning laws) or incentivizing new policies (e.g., best management practices, 
landowner incentive programs). These policies would need to vary by the characteristics 
and demands of each region with some focusing on the needs of private landowner and 
others focused on issues common to public land use (e.g., grazing rights, recreation). 
The immense demands of broad-scale problems affecting species across the U.S. and 
around the world requires broad-scale solutions that encourage conservation on several 
levels.  
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CHAPTER III 
UNCERTAINTY AND ESA DECISIONS 
Due to the current alteration of the Earth’s ecosystems through human over-population 
and exploitation of Earth’s resources, many paleontologists and biologists believe we are 
on the verge of a great extinction event with some ecosystems experiencing extinction 
rates >1000 times the background rate (Pimm et al. 2014). Conservation efforts have 
managed to slow the decline of many species and, in the U.S., the Endangered Species 
Act (ESA) of 1973 is considered one of the most powerful laws meant to slow species 
decline and extinction. Some characteristics may cause a species to be more vulnerable 
to extinction than others. Extinction probability increases with the inability of a species 
to disperse efficiently (McKinney 1997, Pimm et al. 2014), lower reproductive and 
survival rates (Purvis et al. 2000), increasing size of home ranges (i.e., individual’s 
territory size) (Benscoter et al. 2013), and life history complexity (Koh et al. 2004). 
Studies have shown that taxonomic group is not a good predictor of extinction risk 
(Ando 1999, Jenkins et al. 2013); however, some characteristics of species within certain 
taxonomic groups can predict likelihood of extinction. For example, McKinney 
(Doremus) found that large body size is a good predictor of extinction risk except in fish, 
because, he theorized, it is difficult for small fish species to disperse safely. He also 
found that poorly dispersing mammals and plants go extinct more quickly than their 
widely dispersing relatives (McKinney 1997). Additionally, birds and mammals that 
occur at low densities are more susceptible to extinction than those with small individual 
territories (Benscoter et al. 2013).  
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Specific threats and threat accumulation can also contribute to likelihood of 
species extinction. Examples of preeminent threats that can be the singular cause of a 
species’ decline include the effect of DDT on Bald Eagles (Haliaeetus leucocephalus) or 
over-hunting of the extinct Passenger Pigeon (Ectopistes migratorius). The majority of 
declining species, however, are experiencing the synergistic effects of multiple threats, 
which influence their habitat, reproductive success, and survival. Even when a threat is 
severe, such as an expansive disease, it is rarely the single contributing factor that leads 
to decline or extinction (Heard et al. 2013). For example, Gonzalez-Suarez and Revilla 
(2014) found that increasing extinction risk correlated with increasing number of threats 
to mammals listed on the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) Red 
List.  
Population and range size are also potential contributing factors to level of 
extinction risk for a species. Extinction risk increases greatly with decreasing species 
range size (Manne et al. 1999, Purvis et al. 2000) and abundance (McKinney 1997) and 
increasing fragmentation (Henle et al. 2004). Low population density and high temporal 
variation in population size also correspond with increased likelihood of extinction 
except for species adapted to persisting at low population densities (McKinney 1997). 
The influence of habitat fragmentation and population size on extinction risk varies by 
life history traits, which are determined by the evolutionary history of the species. For 
example, Henle et al. (2004) reviewed the empirical data and hypotheses of various 
theories predicting the sensitivity of species to fragmentation and recent population 
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decline and concluded that the level of species specialization influences the way an 
otherwise stable population reacts to changes in habitat.   
Ecological specialization and isolation of populations appears to be a formidable 
indicator of extinction risk. Stefanaki et al. (2015) concluded that range restrictedness 
and endemism was not related to vulnerability of plants in the Mediterranean. Instead, 
they found that vulnerability of extinction, the main external threat being human induced 
land-use changes, was positively correlated increasing distance between a taxon’s most 
distant population as well as floral complexity (i.e., only pollinated by specialized 
pollinators). There is increasing evidence that specialized species in all taxa are being 
displaced by habitat generalists that are rapidly adapting to human-induced changes in 
their environment (McKinney 1997, Henle et al. 2004, Eskildsen et al. 2015).  
The opinions of the success of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) in its 40 years 
of implementation vary. Very few species listed have recovered to the point of delisting 
(Abbitt and Scott 2001, Beissinger and Perrine 2001); however, supporters of the ESA 
point out the prevention of extinction and population-level improvement for many 
species protected under the Act (Schwartz 2008, Greewald et al. 2013). Much of the 
contention surrounding the ESA relates to listing decisions and ambiguity of 
terminology within the Act (Bean 2009, Waples et al. 2013). Determinations of species 
status under the ESA (i.e., endangered, threatened, not warranted), made by U.S. Fish 
and Wildlife Service (FWS) and National Marine Fisheries Service (USFWS and 
NMFS), are required to be made solely based on the best scientific and commercial data 
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available and without the consideration of possible economic or other effects (ESA, 
Section 4). Comprehensive data on population and range extent are more likely for 
species that are common within large geographical ranges; however, ample population 
data is exceedingly rare for the majority of species in existence (Pimm et al. 2014). 
Additionally, science can only make predictions regarding risk of extinction and cannot 
provide guidance for how much risk is acceptable. Doremus (1997) stated that “the 
ESA’s ‘strictly science’ mandate rests on the assumption that conservation policy 
decisions can be made objectively on the basis of existing or reasonably attainable 
scientific knowledge”, an assumption she declared as wrong and “impossible to 
implement”. Because there is no declaration in the ESA regarding the degree of risk of 
extinction qualifies a species to be protected, decisions on listing a species under the 
ESA are value judgements, legally mandated to be informed primarily by science, that 
are disposed to effects from various other influences.  
The cost, both ecological and social, of protecting species that do not need 
protection (Type I error) and not protecting species that need protection (Type II error) 
are significant; therefore, it is important to recognize which factors are influencing ESA 
listing decisions in situations of meager scientific data and equivocal legislative 
mandates. Previous studies support the theory that non-biological factors can influence 
the likelihood of protection by the ESA including those mentioned above (i.e., species 
body size and taxonomic group as well as procedural influences such as regulatory delay 
(Bechtold 1999). Regulatory delay (e.g., increasing time as a candidate species) is 
believed to be a way bureaucratic entities avoid decision-making, likely in response to 
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pressure from outside interest groups (Ando 1999). For example, Bechtold (1999) 
determined that FWS delayed listing the Bull Trout (Salvelinus confluentus) by making 
the determination that it was warranted but precluded in an attempt to avoid listing it 
altogether.  
 My goal for this study was to evaluate the role, if any, of species characteristics, 
population metrics, and threat level serve in the listing decisions under the ESA. Based 
on this previous research on the effects of characteristics that influence extinction risk 
and ESA listing decision, I evaluated several predictions (Table 7). I also evaluated 
potential listing bias by assessing discrepancies in endangerment status between ESA 
listing decision and NatureServe classification (discussed below), a non-legal rank also 
used by previous research on ESA listing decisions (Wilcove and Master 2005, Laband 
and Nieswiadomy 2006, Gratwicke et al. 2012) as a proxy for potential of species for 
formal listing.  
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Table 7. Predicted influence of explanatory variables on likelihood of protection under 
the Endangered Species Act.  
Explanatory 
variable 
Prediction Citation 
Body size Increasing body size increases likelihood 
of protection. 
Metrick and 
Weitzman (1996) 
Taxonomic 
group 
Reptiles and fish less likely to be listed 
than other taxa. 
Gratwicke et al. 
(2012)  
 Plants less likely to be listed than animal 
species. 
Harllee et al. 
(2009)  
Threats Increasing number of threats increase 
likelihood of protection. 
Gonzalez-Suarez 
and Revilla (2014)  
Time as 
candidate 
Increasing time as candidate increases 
likelihood of protection. 
Ando (1999); 
Bechtold (1999) 
Range size Decreasing range size increases likelihood 
of protection. 
McKinney (1997)  
Population size Decreasing population size increases 
likelihood of protection. 
McKinney (1997)  
 
Methods 
Data collection 
From 10 February 2011 to 3 October 2014, I collected ESA listing decisions conducted 
on species that occur in the U.S., Proposed Rules for not warranted and warranted but 
precluded species and Final Rules for endangered and threatened species (hereafter 
“Rules”), published in the Federal Register (http://www.regulations.gov/). In order to 
avoid bias, I randomly sampled one species from multi-species decisions >6 species and 
did not include species evaluated in multi-species decisions of >14 species because they 
were all Hawaiian species that were evaluated as a group based on threats to their 
ecosystem, not individual species. For each species, I collected general information such 
as listing decision, taxonomic class (hereafter taxa), number of potential threats, time as 
candidate (see above), FWS region and office, and number of other species in the listing 
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decision. In order to maintain sufficient sample size, I combined reptiles and amphibians 
into “herpetofauna” and categorized all invertebrates as “aquatic” or “terrestrial” (for 7 
total taxonomic categories). I accessed NatureServe (http://explorer.natureserve.org) for 
additional potential threats and conservation status ranks (G1 – G5). NatureServe, an 
independent organization which works closely with the International Union for 
Conservation of Nature to expertly assess threats and levels of endangerment of species, 
is not legally recognized but has been used previously as an indicator of potential for 
formal listings under the ESA (Metrick and Weitzman 1996, Gratwicke et al. 2012). I 
calculated number of threats by totaling the number of threats cited by the Rule or 
NatureServe. This sum could include multiple threats under one criteria category 
discussed Section 4 of the ESA. I determined time as candidate by calculating the time 
since the FWS initially deemed the species warranted for full review in a 90-day Rule 
and the date of the Proposed Rule (Fig. 1).  
 I recorded population estimates, population range size estimates, and descriptive 
location information from both the published Rules and NatureServe. For each species, I 
recorded the maximum and minimum population estimates and maximum and minimum 
range size estimates as well as if FWS estimated the population or range size in the Rule. 
Additionally, I recorded the states where the species are currently known to occur, if it 
utilizes island or mainland habitat, and if it is known to occur outside the U.S. during 
any part of its life history requirements (i.e., Canada or Mexico). I also determined if the 
species occurs primarily (>50% of current range) on public (e.g., managed by U.S. 
Forest Service (USFS), Bureau of Land Management (BLM), National Park Service 
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(NPS)) or private lands by examining range maps and descriptions of their current range 
in the Rules published by the FWS.  
Statistical analyses 
All statistical analyses were conducting using R software for statistical computing and 
graphics (R Core Development Team 2013). I initially conducted preliminary analysis to 
determine if ESA listing decisions (i.e., endangered, threatened, warranted but 
precluded, or not warranted) was independent of descriptive explanatory variables 
associated with each species by conducting a chi-square analysis for categorical 
variables (i.e., taxa, FWS region, habitat ownership, island vs mainland, overlap with 
Canada or Mexico) and analysis of variance (ANOVA) for continuous variables (i.e., 
time as candidate, number of threats, maximum and minimum population estimates, 
maximum and minimum range size estimates; Agresti (2007)). I also conducted a chi-
square test to evaluate if listing potential (i.e., NatureServe conservation rank) 
corresponded with ESA listing decision.   
To account for the influence of explanatory variables on each other as they 
related to their effect on likelihood of protection under the ESA, I fit a logistic regression 
model with generalized linear models (Bates and Maechler 2009). Response variable 
was coded by combining species that were designated endangered and threatened 
(“protected”) and not warranted species (“not protected”). I excluded species with 
warranted but precluded decisions because they are still undecided for protection under 
the ESA. To select variables associated with likelihood of protection under the ESA, I 
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used forward selection with backward elimination and Akaike information criterion for 
small samples sizes (AICc) as selection criterion (Burnham and Anderson 2003). I 
stopped adding variables when they no longer reduced AICc by > 2 because values 
within that window are considered equivalent. When no new variables could be added, I 
added 2-way interaction terms for taxa and population size and taxa and range size. I 
was able to identify a single best model for likelihood of protection and did not perform 
model averaging for evaluation of explanatory variables. I then conducted a Fisher’s 
multi-comparison test to specify which taxa and FWS regions differed by likelihood of 
protection (Agresti 2007). 
Results 
I collected data on 143 ESA listing decisions from 101 Rules published by the FWS in 
the Federal Register between 10 February 2011 and 3 October 2014. Of the total listing 
decisions, 82 (57%) came from multiple species rules (i.e., ≥2 species per rule) and 61 
(43%) were single species decisions. Of the species evaluated, 78 (~55%) have habitat 
that occurs primarily on private property while the remaining 65 (~45%) species occur 
primarily on public land. Fifty-one (35.7%) of the 143 species were designated as 
endangered, 22 (15.4%) were designated as threatened, 17 (11.9%) were deemed 
warranted but precluded, and 53 (37.1%) were declared not warranted for protection 
under the ESA. 
The majority (28%) of the species evaluated were plants and the least represented 
were birds (6.3%) and mammals (6.3%) (Table 8). Mean (± SD) time each species was a 
candidate (i.e., time since the species was initially deemed warranted for full review) 
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was 189.2 ± 151.6 months. Median time as candidate for endangered, threatened, 
warranted but precluded, and not warranted species was 271, 153, 20, and 103 months, 
respectively. Plants spent more time on the candidate list than other taxa and birds spent 
the least (Table 8). Mean (± SD) number of threats listed for a species given by Rule or 
NatureServe was 4.6 ± 1.9 with herpetofauna having the most number of threats (6 ± 2), 
on average (Table 8). Of all species evaluated, most had the highest NatureServe 
conservation rank of G1 and G2 and species FWS listed as threatened and warranted but 
precluded had the most evenly distributed ranks (Fig. 4). 
Figure 4. Count of species evaluated under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) from 
2011 – 2014 by rank given by NatureServe for level of endangerment of extinction and 
ESA listing decision. 
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Table 8. Count and percentage of species evaluated under the Endangered Species Act 
(ESA) by U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) from 2011 – 2014 by taxonomic group 
and ESA listing decision (endangered = EN, threatened = TH, warranted but precluded = 
PR, not warranted = NW), mean (± SD) months as candidate species, mean (± SD) 
months proposed for protection, and mean number of threats (± SD) cited in both the 
Federal Register Rules and on NatureServe. 
Taxonomic 
group Count EN TH PR NW 
Months 
candidatea
Months 
proposedb
#  
threats
Plants 40 
(28.0%) 16 7 2 15 
261.0 
± 162.2 
12.3 
± 2.2 4 ± 1 
Terrestrial 
invertebrates 
30 
(21.0%) 8 0 6 16 
146.2 
± 145.7 
12.9 
± 5.1 4 ± 1 
Aquatic 
invertebrates 
23 
(16.1%) 14 3 5 1 
181.5 
± 145.7 
12.1 
± 1.5 5 ± 2 
Herpetofauna 18 
(12.6%) 6 7 1 4 
155.4 
± 118.8 
13.3 
± 2.4 6 ± 2 
Fish 14 
(9.8%) 5 1 1 7 
156.8 
± 118.8 
13.0 
± 2.4 5 ± 2 
Mammals 9 
(6.3%) 2 1 2 4 
123.0 
± 114.7 
13.3 
± 2.3 5 ± 2 
Birds 9 
(6.3%) 0 3 0 6 
111.7 
± 58.3 
14.7 
± 4.6 5 ± 2 
Total 
143 51 22 17 53 
189.2 ± 
151.6 
12.7 
± 2.7 5 ± 2 
aCalculated as number of months from the time a species was considered a candidate  
species by FWS to the time a Proposed Rule was published in the Federal Register 
bCalculated as number of months between the published Proposed and Final Rules in the 
Federal Register 
Factors influencing ESA listing decisions 
Taxa influenced ESA decision (218 = 43.203, p < 0.001) and FWS region appears to 
influence the likelihood of protection (221 = 51.949, p < 0.001). ESA decision is 
influenced by both primary ownership of the species habitat (i.e., public vs. private; 23 = 
23.658, p < 0.001) and if the species utilizes aquatic or terrestrial habitats (26 = 20.735, 
p = 0.002). Island and mainland species did not differ by ESA decision (26 = 6.124, p = 
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0.41) and it did not matter if the species range overlapped Canada or Mexico (29 = 
11.340, p = 0.253). There was no association between ESA decision (i.e., endangered, 
threatened, warranted but precluded, not warranted) and NatureServe rank (212 = 
12.995, p = 0.369). 
Time as candidate species influenced listing decision (F141 = 12.8, p = 0.0005; 
Fig. 5). There was no difference in candidate length for species designated as 
endangered and threatened or threatened and not warranted (Fig. 5). However, there 
was a significant difference in candidate time for endangered and warranted but 
precluded; endangered and not warranted; threatened and warranted but precluded; and 
warranted but precluded and not warranted (Fig. 5). Number of threats also had a 
significant effect on listing decisions (F141 = 22.4, p < 0.001; Fig. 6). Species designated 
as not warranted had significantly fewer threats than species designated as endangered, 
threatened, or warranted but precluded while all other designations were equivalent in 
number of threats cited (Fig. 6). Estimated maximum current range size influenced ESA 
decision but no population estimates (maximum or minimum) influenced ESA listing 
decision (Table 9). However, once I removed the four outliers (one not warranted and 
three threatened species) maximum range sizes were equivalent for all ESA decisions 
(F107 = 0.392, p = 0.759).  
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Figure 5. Boxplot representing time spent as a candidate (i.e., number of months from 
the time a species was considered a candidate species by U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 
(FWS) to the time the Proposed Rule was published in the Federal Register) for 
Endangered Species Act (ESA) decisions made from 2011 – 2014. 
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Figure 6. Boxplot representing the number of threats to a species listed in the Rule by the 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and NatureServe by Endangered Species Act listing 
decision for species evaluated under the ESA from 2011 – 2014. 
 
 
Table 9. ANOVA results for the influence of population and range size estimates, 
maximum and minimum, given in the Rule published in the Federal Register by the U.S. 
Fish and Wildlife Service and by NatureServe on Endangered Species Act listing 
decision.  
Independent variable n F df p   
   Maximum population 103 1.788 99 0.154  
   Minimum population 104 1.833 100 0.146  
   Maximum range 117 2.822 113 0.042  
   Minimum range 117 0.694 113 0.558   
        
 
Model of best predictors of protection under ESA 
I included six parameters in the final logistic regression model (Table 10). The best fit 
model differed significantly from the intercept only model (likelihood ratio test: 2 = 
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87.633; df =  6; p <0.001), and there was no evidence of lack of fit (Pearson’s 2 
goodness-of-fit test: 2 = 77.470; df = 119, p = 0.984). I found that when a species was 
evaluated alone, it was 7.6% less likely to be protected under the ESA than a species that 
was included with other species in the listing decision. Species evaluated in the 
Southeastern FWS region (4) were over ~23 times more likely to be given ESA 
protection than species evaluated in other regions; however, there is no difference in 
likelihood of protection in the Mountain Prairie region (6) when all other listing 
characteristics were considered so it was omitted from the model. Aquatic invertebrates 
and herpetofauna were ~23 and ~5 times more likely, respectively, to receive protection 
than other taxa. Species that primarily occupy public lands were 23.6% less likely to be 
protected by the ESA than species occurring primarily on private land. Finally, the odds 
of a species being protected increased ~2.5 times as the number of threats increased by 
one.  
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Table 10. Significant parameters in the final logistic regression model representing the 
probability of protection under the Endangered Species Act for species evaluated from 
2011 – 2014 by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS).  
 SE p odds ratio 
Intercept -2.862 0.934 0.002 
Dichotomous variables 
   Single species rulea -2.583 0.724 <0.001 0.076 
   FWS Region 4b 3.123 0.915 0.001 22.724 
   Taxac 
      Aquatic inv. 3.124 1.254 0.013 22.744 
      Herpetofauna 1.614 0.872 0.064 5.024 
   Private ownershipd -1.445 0.569 0.011 0.236 
Continuous variable 
   Threats 0.909 0.212 <0.001 2.482 
aCompared to multiple species (>2) decisions. 
bCompared to other FWS Regions. 
cCompared to other taxonomic groups 
dSpecies occurring primarily on private lands as opposed to those occurring on public 
land. 
Discussion 
The strong influence of non-biological variables, specifically FWS region and ownership 
of habitat, on listing decision indicate that scientific and commercial data are not the sole 
source of influence on which species are protected under the ESA. Population estimates 
had no influence on likelihood of protection in my model despite the expectation that 
abundance would be a primary indictor of level of imperilment. Additionally, I did not 
find a correlation between NatureServe conservation rank and ESA listing decision, a 
result that supports previous research indicating that species of high conservation 
concern are not more likely to be protected under the ESA than species of less concern 
(Wilcove and Master 2005, Laband and Nieswiadomy 2006, Gratwicke et al. 2012). 
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My results indicate that species included in multi-species Rules are more likely 
to be protected under the ESA than those that are evaluated on their own; therefore, it is 
critical to determine if multi-species evaluations are of less quality (i.e., less rigorous, 
poorer use of science) than single species decisions. In the Interagency Policy for the 
Ecosystem Approach to the ESA, released by the Department of Interior and Department 
of Commerce (59 FR 34274, 1 July 1994), the stated purpose was to “provide a means 
whereby the ecosystem upon which endangered and threatened species depend may be 
conserved” (ESA, Section 2(b)). This was to be done partially by “grouping listing 
decisions based on a geographic, taxonomic, or ecosystem basis where possible”. FWS 
rarely applied this policy until the recent court decisions mandating the large number of 
listing decisions by 2016 (WildEarth Guardians v. Salazar 2011) and, therefore, the 
impact of its application has not been evaluated until now.  
There are potential benefits to listing several species in one listing decisions, both 
for conservation purposes and bureaucratic efficiency. Species that occur within the 
same ecosystem or geographic area likely face similar threats that FWS can identify and 
evaluate concurrently, decreasing their workload. Additionally, if multiple species that 
occur in the same geographic area are protected at the same time, then recovery and 
management actions can be implemented simultaneously which would potentially 
decrease overall cost. Because much of the ESA costs are indirect, they are difficult to 
quantify and, therefore, no explicit data exists to assess cost savings for integrative 
approaches to conservation (Ando 2001). Ando (2001) concluded that FWS benefits 
from listing several species in one rule because it decreases the overall interest group 
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opposition. She found that, above a certain count, more species that are already protected 
under the ESA by county increases the likelihood of opposition to new listings. 
Additionally, the amount of opposition did not increase as the number of species in the 
decision increased.   
Likelihood of protection increased as number of threats increased which supports 
my prediction and potentially indicates species protected under the ESA are in more 
need of protection than those designated as not warranted for protection. It is possible 
this correlation is also the result of FWS listing more threats in the Final Rules in order 
to justify protection of species under the ESA (i.e., more support for their decision). 
Another cause of this correlation may be “discovery bias,” which Heard et al. (2013) 
described as the accumulation of increasing knowledge as an artifact of amassed 
resources for species whose extinction risk continues to increase. My data shows that the 
likelihood of protection by the ESA was much higher for species that had been on the 
candidate list for >10 yrs. The longer a species is warranted but precluded from 
protection, the more likely research dollars and time may be channeled its direction, 
which would subsequently increase awareness of threats. There is also the possibility 
that species that spend a long time waiting to be protected under the ESA accumulate 
more threats (e.g., more population fragmentation, loss of genetic diversity) and, thus, 
delaying the benefits of protection under the ESA and decreasing chances of recovery 
(Ando 1999).  
My results indicate that larger body size (e.g., mammals and birds) is not a 
significant predictor of protection under the ESA despite the previous research that 
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suggested large body size and “likeability” by humans increases likelihood of support 
for conservation (Metrick and Weitzman 1996, Gunnthorsdottir 2001). This may be 
because many of the larger mammals in the U.S. are already protected under the act 
(e.g., Gray Wolf (Canis lupus), Grizzly Bear (Ursus arctos horribilis), Florida Panther 
(Puma concolor coryi)). Gratwicke et al. (2012) found that > 80% of U.S. amphibians 
listed by NatureServe as at risk in 2011 remained unprotected by the ESA. My data 
indicates that herpetofauna, which includes amphibians, are more likely to be protected 
by the ESA than most other taxa. It should be noted, however, that my study only 
includes species that FWS judged as having substantial merit in the initial 90-day Rules 
to deserve a full evaluation. Further research is needed to determine if certain taxonomic 
classes are more or less likely to be petitioned or considered warranted for further review 
during the early evaluation phases under the ESA.  
 It is clear that for the majority of species I evaluated there is a high level of 
uncertainty surrounding their population sizes and range extents, primarily evident 
because FWS enumerated these estimates in only one third of listing decisions (see 
Chapter 2). Previous research suggests that uncertainty allows for increased agency 
discretion (Schultz 2008) and uncertainty, along with the ESA “science only” mandate, 
appears to encourage the FWS to conceal the true basis for their decisions, make their 
decisions appear objective and certain, and ultimately undermine political support by 
declaring that science is the ultimate foundation for their decisions (Doremus 1997). For 
example, FWS was substantially more likely to list aquatic invertebrates than any other 
taxa but gave no range extent estimation in the Rules on any aquatic invertebrate species. 
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Ando (2001) concluded that vertebrate species, with larger range sizes and greater 
potential for conflict, are more likely to incur more opposition than invertebrates. The 
increased likelihood of protection for invertebrates may be due to lack of opposition and 
general public interest in invertebrate listing decision.  
ESA listing decisions appear to be influenced, at least in part, by criteria other 
than level of endangerment. Previous research indicates that political factors may play a 
role in ESA listing decisions including environmental attitudes of legislators (Harllee et 
al. 2009), participation of legislators in relevant Congressional subcommittees (Rawls 
and Laband 2004), and cultural attributes within the state such as hunting and fishing 
participation and percentage of farmland (Laband and Nieswiadomy 2006). My research 
shows that land ownership (i.e., public vs. private) of habitat and FWS region have a 
large influence on likelihood of protection. These results may be an artifact of higher 
threat levels (e.g., human population size, development, invasive species) for species in 
specific locations that correspond with these variables. It is also possible that these 
differences are influenced by political or cultural variation within the states or regions 
where the species occur or that listing decisions are influenced by bounded rationale and 
institutionalized agency norms within the FWS (Gerlach et al. 2013). I will evaluate the 
role, if any, of threat from organized business interests to species and address potential 
political and cultural influences on the quality of ESA decisions in Chapter 4. 
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CHAPTER IV 
INSTITUTIONAL BEHAVIOR AND DECISION QUALITY 
Bureaucracies in the U.S. exert a large amount of power not only through 
implementation of policy but also by creating it when policy mandates are incomplete. 
Indeed, bureaucrats make the majority of policy decisions compared to legislators 
(Meier 1993). Bureaucratic behavior is a dynamic process made up of both top-down 
and bottom-up motivating factors from legislators and the public, respectively (Wood 
and Waterman 1993, Bennedsen and Feldmann 2006). Additionally, information 
included  in legislation that is implemented by bureaucrats is almost always ambiguous 
(Zahariadis 1999) which leaves decisions open to interpretation by agencies as well as 
outside influences. Scholars have produced a large body of research exploring who 
influences bureaucratic decision-making and how they go about doing so. Entities 
believed to influence bureaucratic behavior once  legislation has passed include 
politicians (i.e., Congress and the President) (Ando 1999, Innes and Mitra 2015), interest 
groups (Yackee 2006), the public (Eckerd 2014), and the dynamics within the agency 
itself (Francis et al. 2005, Meier and O'Toole 2006). 
 Bounded rationality theory asserts that decision-makers are confined by what 
they can comprehend as well as the time and resources available to them (Simon 1972). 
March (1978) stated that rational choice involves two guesses, one about uncertain 
future consequences and the other about uncertain future preferences. Bureaucrats 
deduce future consequences based on previous experiences (Gerlach et al. 2013) and 
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bureaucratic institutions seek to enhance legitimacy, increase resources, and augment the 
likelihood of existence into the future (Meyer and Rowan 1991, Townley 1997). 
Additionally, many bureaucratic institutions operate under the logic of avoidance of 
negative feedback, a concept that is fundamental to bureaucratic behavior when 
assessing mechanisms during limited time frames (Baumgartner and Jones 2002).  
When bounded rationality, institutionalism, and negative feedback are 
incorporated, predictions can be made regarding bureaucratic behavior. Additionally, 
factors influencing behavior may differ depending on incentives or potential 
consequences imposed on bureaucrats at the regional versus local level. In this chapter, I 
compare the influence of opposing interest groups, public attention, and political 
pressure on bureaucratic decision-making quality (i.e., decisions that are nearest to the 
intention of the legislation) under high and low workloads at both the regional and office 
level. I will begin by outlining the theories and previous research regarding the influence 
of interest groups, public attention, and political pressure on bureaucratic behavior. I will 
then assess which factors, if any, influence decision quality of Endangered Species Act 
(ESA) listing decisions made by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and if any of 
these factors interact with political influences at either the regional or office level under 
low or high workload conditions.  
Interest Groups and Bureaucratic Decisions 
The theory of pluralism postulates that in an open democratic environment, the policies 
that win out are those supported by the greatest number of interests while the theory of 
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elitism suggests that a small minority of actors hold the majority of the power to 
influence policy. Garson (1978) suggested that neither of these ideas represent a holistic 
view of interest group influence. Many scholars believe resources (e.g., money, time) 
increase the ability of interest groups to organize and exert their influence (Lowi 1969, 
Schlozman 1984). Indeed, Yackee and Yackee (2006) found that agencies alter decisions 
to be amenable to business interests, consistently well-organized and funded, but not for 
other interest groups. McKay (2012), in contrast, found that any interest groups that 
participated in negative lobbying (i.e., lobbying against a proposal) were more likely to 
defeat proponents, regardless of resources, and with less effort. Even so, other research 
indicates that the loudest groups (i.e., those that are the most organized, consistent, and 
united) receive the most agency attention and are more likely to influence policy than 
other groups (McKay and Yackee 2007), likely because agencies wish to avoid the high 
public attention conditions organized interest groups can trigger (Epstein and O'Halloran 
1995). Recently pro-environmental interest group influence has grown through increased 
membership, lobbying, and litigation practices (Dalton 2005) which may indicate an 
increase in their ability to substantially influence agency decision-making as well.  
 Due to fears over too much agency discretion, the Administrative Procedures Act 
(APA) of 1946 requires agencies to publish a notice of all proposed rules in the Federal 
Register and request comments from the public. However, public comments are 
relegated to the later stages of the policy development process, typically once the critical 
issues and decisions have been made (Nixon et al. 2002, West 2009). Some agencies are 
encouraged to invite participation by selected stakeholders in proposal development. For 
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example, the Department of the Interior (DOI) guidelines encourage avoidance of 
communications with outside stakeholders once an agency publishes a public notice but 
provide no restrictions before publishing. Due to its informality and idiosyncratic nature, 
influence of participation by external stakeholders in early policy development is less 
understood than the later, more public, stages of the agency decision-making process and 
can vary greatly across and within agencies (West 2009). However, agencies likely 
maximize their own interests (i.e., avoid criticism and increased oversight) by including 
interest groups affected by their decisions and utilizing the resources they provide 
(Crone and Tschirhart 1998) and there is case study evidence that pre-proposal 
participation by interest groups can influence content of proposed rule (Rinfret 2011). 
Early access of interest groups can increase decision bias because those that provide the 
information will likely provide information that primarily supports their cause. This bias 
in proposal development is exacerbated when the bureaucrats who staff the agency are 
politically inclined in the same direction as the interest group (Patty 2009). 
Public Attention and Political Pressure 
In order to justify inserting oneself into a bureaucratic decision process, an organization 
or individual is concluding that the benefits outweigh the consequences of not acting. 
However, benefits are not always explicit or directly observable. The goals and needs of 
legislators, interest groups, and the public interact, despite often being evaluated as 
separate influences on agency behavior. There is evidence that lobbying by interest 
groups has a substantial effect on legislative oversight or agencies (Hall and Miler 
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2008). Additionally, Boehmke et al. (2013) found that interest groups engage in 
extensive agency lobbying of bureaucrats and the amount of lobbying by specific 
interest groups is strongly related to the amount of activity of the same groups in the 
legislature. Some scholars theorize that the political power has shifted towards the 
agencies. For example, Lee (2012) suggests that some agencies are political 
organizations that have the power to influence interest groups through their “brokerage 
capacity”, which allows them to create favorable environments for negotiating directly 
with interest groups in order to increase agency discretion and decrease negative 
feedback.  
Issue salience, defined as an issue being very important or visible to the public, 
can influence Congressional behavior towards bureaucracies by increasing oversight 
(Epstein and O'Halloran 1995) and decreasing agency discretion (McCubbins 1985), 
especially when there are clear public preferences. However, Ringquist et al. (2003) 
concluded that the effects of salience on legislative activity decreases as policy 
complexity increases. Therefore, the amount of discretion given to agencies may be 
lower when the policy arena involves complex issues, no matter how much the public is 
paying attention. Congress often relies on the public to act as “fire alarms”, alerting them 
to independent bureaucratic drift away from legislative preferences (McCubbins and 
Schwartz 1984, Bennedsen and Feldmann 2006). Additionally, salience influences 
interest group behavior because groups can use conflict to increase public awareness in 
order to exert pressure on decision makers and Congress (Kollman 1998). 
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Use of Science in Policy Decisions: The Endangered Species Act 
Currently, some of the most contentious aspects of the ESA surround the role of “best 
scientific and commercial data available” as the sole indicator of whether or not a 
species should be listed as endangered or threatened. There are several practical issues 
surrounding the idea that good science alone can provide unbiased guidance in listing 
decisions under the ESA. First, the “best” science for a species is sometimes 
observational records or professional intuitions that lack scientific rigor and 
accountability; the FWS gives them equal sanction as peer-reviewed journal articles in 
the absence more reliable research. Second, what constitutes good science is an 
axiological question that changes over time in the scientific community. For example, a 
widely accepted method for approximating population metrics can fall in and out of 
favor in the scientific community because of new evidence or methodologies. Finally, 
even when comprehensive scientific information is available and agreed upon, it cannot 
inform an acceptable level of risk to a species or ecosystem; therefore, FWS staff must 
inevitably make a value judgement (Doremus 1997, Wilhere 2008). Congress has 
intensified this burden because of the absence of clear definitions of “endangered” and 
“threatened” designations for species under the Act (Doremus 1997, Bean 2009, Regan 
et al. 2013). Bureaucracies, including FWS, are part of a political system and are not 
neutral bodies (Lee 2012).  When a bureaucratic entity such as the FWS responds to 
external pressures from politicians (Wood and Waterman 1993), special interests 
(Leaver 2009), the public (Eckerd 2014), or the predisposition of its employees (Meier 
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and O'Toole 2006) it is not relying —and perhaps cannot rely—solely on the “best 
scientific and commercial information available”.  
Despite the requirement that the listing of species under the ESA should be based 
on best available science only, interest group action and Congressional characteristics 
have been shown to have a prominent role in listing decisions (Ando 1999;2001, Brosi 
and Biber 2012). However, factors that affect ESA decisions differ between the pre-
proposal and post-proposed rule periods. For example, once a proposed rule (i.e., agency 
decision that is proposed to the public for review before it is finalized) has been drafted 
and published, an increasing number of support comments and higher salience hasten 
time to final rule while a single opposing comment in the absence of support slows down 
publication of final rules (Ando 1999). Ando (1999) also found that Congressional 
environmental voting record on ESA subcommittees effects the rate at which species are 
protected pre-proposal but not post. It also appears the amount of historical interaction 
that stakeholders have with the ESA (i.e., number of previously protected species within 
the county) can affect their propensity to participate in the process of new listing 
decisions, leading to delays in protection or no protection of new species (Ando 2001). 
Additionally, Ando (2001) found that interest group participation, both pro- and anti- 
species listing, increases as the perception that the species is threatened by economic 
activity increases, regardless of whether or not the species occurs primarily on public or 
private land.  
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Recently, environmentalist groups have used litigation and the threat of litigation 
to pressure FWS to make decisions on over 700 candidate species, which were waiting 
to be fully evaluated under the ESA, citing the scientific information that best supports 
their agendas while accusing FWS of purposely delaying the listing of species. A recent 
and controversial approach by environmental groups is to petition a large number of 
species at one time (74 FR 419, 78 FR 10601), causing FWS and NMFS to miss 
procedural deadlines and leading to litigation and settlements.  There is evidence that 
litigation has significantly decreased delays in listing decisions (Goble 2005) likely to 
benefit of species in need of protection (Ando 1999). Additionally, Biber and Brosi 
(2010) found no evidence to support that petitions or litigation significantly lead to 
uninformed decision-making, interfered with FWS agenda setting, or over-enforced the 
ESA by listing species that are not in need of protection. Nevertheless, the overall long-
term effect of litigation on the limited resources of FWS and NMFS and, subsequently, 
the reliability of science used in ESA decisions remains unclear. In 2011, FWS reached 
agreements with WildEarth Guardians and The Center for Biological Diversity to create 
a multi-year work plan to review 251 candidate species to determine if they should be 
added to the Federal Lists of Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants by 2016 
(WildEarth Guardians v. Salazar 2011). Due to this decision, numerous ESA listing 
decisions made during a narrow period with little administrative and personnel variation 
can be used to evaluate bureaucratic decisions and the factors that influence decision 
quality.  
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Based on previous research on bureaucratic behavior and the use of science in 
agency decisions, I predict that decision quality will vary according to various perceived 
pressures (i.e., public and political opposition, public attention) on FWS and the degree 
to which the negative feedback influences decision quality depends on the workload 
experienced by the bureaucrats involved in the decision-making. Specifically, I predict 
higher workload regions and offices will have lower overall decision quality because 
they will need to prioritize effort toward some species over others due to resource 
constraints. In high workload regions and offices, I predict decision quality will be 
higher under circumstances of high public attention, when business is listed as a direct 
threat to the species, and under circumstances of high opposition to the decision through 
public comments. Finally, I predict decision quality will be the highest for species that 
occur in in pro-land use states (i.e., more conservative) compared to pro-environmental 
states (i.e., more liberal), particularly when there is high public attention, business is 
listed as a direct, and when there is high public opposition to the decision.  
Methods 
Species information 
From 2011 to 2014, I collected ESA listing decisions conducted on species that occur in 
the U.S.; Proposed Rules for not warranted and warranted but precluded species and 
Final Rules for endangered and threatened species (hereafter “Rules”) published in the 
Federal Register (http://www.regulations.gov/). Not warranted species are those that 
FWS deems not eligible for protection under the ESA because there is not sufficient 
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evidence regarding their biological status and threats to conclude they are at risk of 
extinction in the near future. Species that FWS deems warranted but precluded become 
candidate species that qualify for protection under the ESA but are precluded by higher 
priority species of greater immediate need of protection.  
Species in Rules with >2 species, which were given the same determination (i.e., 
endangered, threatened, not warranted, warranted but precluded), were more likely to 
have similar interest group participation, political interest, and public attention. In order 
to avoid this bias, I randomly sampled one species from multi-species decisions ≥3 
species. Additionally, I did not include species evaluated in multi-species decisions of 
>14 species because they were all Hawaiian species that FWS evaluated as a group 
based on threats to their ecosystem, not individual species. For each species, I recorded 
threat category (e.g., resource extraction, agriculture, climate change, invasive species) 
in each Rule as well as those listed on NatureServe (http://explorer.natureserve.org), an 
independent organization which works closely with the International Union for 
Conservation of Nature (IUCN) to assess threats and levels of endangerment of species 
through expert opinion. I did not want to rely solely on Rules published by the FWS for 
threats to each species in case political factors influenced inclusion of threats. In order to 
evaluate work load and if different variables effect decision quality at different 
bureaucratic levels, I recorded FWS region and office where each species was evaluated. 
Because there is evidence that ownership of habitat may influence ESA decision (see 
Chapter 3), I also recorded public versus private ownership of the occupied habitat 
described in each Rule. I determined ownership by description of the location of the 
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occupied habitat in the Rule. Species occurring on >50% public land was considered as 
occurring on publically owned land.  
Opposition, public attention, and political influence 
In order to assess the level of opposition to each decision I recorded sentiment of 
comments submitted to the FWS, available on regulations.gov for each species, 
including if the commenter was “for” or “against” the protection of the species under the 
ESA. I classified business as a threat to the species, and therefore potentially opposing 
the decision to protect the species under the ESA, if threats to the species included 
agriculture or resources extraction (e.g., coal, oil, gas) primarily because these industries 
have organized lobbies that maintain contact with the FWS (Yackee and Yackee 2006, 
Braun 2013) as well as Congress and the executive branch (Hall and Miler 2008). I 
evaluated public attention for each species decision by recording the number of total 
news articles published by an established media organization, a metric considered to be 
an accurate metric for comparisons of issue salience (Epstein and Segal 2000), published 
online between 6 months prior and post the date of the publishing of the Proposed Rule.  
I used U.S. Congress League of Conservation Voter score (LCV) for each 
species to assess political influence and potential interaction with public attention on 
decision quality. League of Conservation Voters scorecards rate members of Congress 
based on environmental, public health, and energy issues. Specifically, I averaged 
Senator LCV scores in states where the species occur to proximate level of “pro-
environment” (i.e., 100) or “pro-land-use” (i.e., 0) Congressional representation, similar 
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to Ando (1999). I used Senators opposed to members of the House of Representatives 
because Representatives’ districts are geographically distinct within a state and are 
difficult to match up with the species’ ranges for that state, particularly because ranges 
are only available approximately a third of the time (see Chapter II). Additionally, 
Senators were more likely to speak up and become involved in ESA listing decisions 
during the public comment process (K. Smith-Hicks, unpublished data). Therefore, 
Senator LCV score was the most accurate representation of the political influence given 
the likelihood for a politician to become involved in a listing decision.  
Quality of decision 
The evaluation of decision quality needs to assess not only what literature is used but 
also the relative availability of scientific literature as well as its quality. Therefore, I 
included these variables in the metric to evaluate decision quality of each species 
evaluated by the FWS. In order to do this, I first gauged the proportion of use of the 
most reliable literature (Corn et al. 2002), peer-reviewed journal articles (hereafter PRJ). 
In order to gauge the relative importance of each individual source in the overall 
decision, I calculated the number of times FWS referenced a literature source for 
information regarding population status, population trends, and threats for each species 
in a Rule. Using the list of literature cited for the Rule, typically available on 
regulations.gov but occasionally upon request from the appropriate FWS office, I 
classified each piece of literature into a category (e.g., PRJ, federal report, state report, 
personal communication). I then calculated the available PRJ and total citations by 
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counting these items in the list of literature cited for each Rule. I did not use the total 
number of PRJ available for the species because many PRJ articles focus on information 
irrelevant to a listing decision (i.e., not population or threats). Additionally, I assumed 
the list of literature cited from the FWS contained the literature FWS was aware of at the 
time of the Rule which was consistent with what I wanted my metric to capture. I then 
calculated quality for each ESA decisions according to the equation below.  
  Quality =  
𝑃𝑅𝐽 𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
÷
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠 𝑃𝑅𝐽 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑑
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠 𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑑
 
 Lowell and Kelly (2016) used a similar metric, among many others, to compare 
FWS and National Marine Fisheries Services science use under the ESA. However, they 
did not have information to gauge relative importance of each source to overall decision, 
an issue I overcame by recording the proportion of each source used to the overall 
number of citations used in the decision. I calculated “PRJ citations” as the number of 
PRJ articles used in the rule and “total citations” as the number of individual citations 
included in the rule. I then calculated “total of times PRJ used” as the total number of 
times FWS cited all PRJ as a source and “total of times citations used” as the total times 
FWS used a citation in the rule. Decision quality could range from 0 (poor) to > 1 (high). 
Statistical analyses 
I modeled decision quality at both the regional and office levels using multiple linear 
regression analyses using R 3.1.0 (R Core Development Team 2013) by evaluating both 
linear and mixed models with R packages lme4 (Bates et al. 2014) and AICcmodavg 
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(Mazerolle 2016) following model construction and selection procedures outlined in 
Zuur et al. (2009). I first constructed the most complex models for both region and office 
level, incorporating fixed effects of ownership of habitat, opposition, business threat, 
public attention (loge transformed), and LCV score as well as public attention-workload 
interactions (i.e., public attention x region workload, public attention  x office 
workload), ownership-LCV score interaction (owner x LCV), and public attention-
business interaction (public attention x business). I used likelihood ratio tests to 
determine support for the random effects of region and office (i.e., models with random 
effects vs. without). I then selected the best models based on the Akaike’s Information 
Criterion corrected for small sample sizes (AICc) (Hurvich and Tsai 1989) and 
considered models to be equivalent if their AICc were <2. I used package AICcmodavg 
(Mazerolle 2016) to calculate model-averaged coefficients for the predictive variables 
included in the top models (AICc < 2) to determine overall level and direction of 
influence on decision quality (Burnham and Anderson 2003). 
Results 
I evaluated literature cited, public comments, public attention, League of Conservation 
Voter (LCV) scores, and literature used for 59 species evaluated between 10 February 
2011 and 3 October 2014. USFWS Regions 2, 4, and 8 conducted >30 ESA listing 
decisions; therefore, I classified decisions conducted in these regions as “high” 
workload. Regions 1, 3, 5, 6, and 7 had considerably fewer ESA listing decisions (<20) 
so I classified these as “low” workload (Appendix D). Table 11 presents summary 
statistics for decisions per office, number of public comments, and news articles as well 
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as overall LCV scores. Overall, mean ± SD quality of decisions made by all FWS offices 
was 0.79 ± 0.23 (Table 11). Mean ± SD LCV scores for low and high workload regions 
were 66 ± 29 and 50 ± 34, respectively. Decision quality differed significantly by 
regional workload (t56 = -2.95, p = 0.005) but did not differ by ownership of habitat (t54 
= -1.60, p = 0.12), potential business interest intervention (t38 = -0.36, p = 0.005), or 
opposition through comments against the decision (t53 = -1.09, p = 0.28; Table 12). 
Public attention and opposition were slightly correlated (r52 = 0.49, p < 0.001) so I 
excluded opposition from all subsequent analyses. 
Table 11. Summary statistics for Endangered Species Act listing decisions made by U.S. 
Fish and Wildlife from 2011 – 2014.  
Range Mean Median 
Independent variables 
Decisions per FWS office 1 to 18 5.6 5 
Decisions per FWS region 1 to 47 17.9 12 
News Articlesa 0 to 730 33.2 4 
Public commentsb 1 to 1161 58.8 8 
LCV scorec 7 to 100 56.2 52 
Dependent variable 
Decision quality 0.3 to 1.3 0.79 0.8 
aTotal number of news articles published online 6 months before and after Proposed 
Rule was published in the Federal Register. 
bNumber of public comments submitted to the FWS for each species. 
cLeague of Conservation Voter Score calculated for each species based on U.S. Senator 
voting record in each state where the species occurs. 
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Table 12. Mean (SD) decision quality for Endangered Species Act listing decisions made 
by U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service for categorical variables evaluated from 2011 – 2014. 
      Decision Quality 
Predictive variables  Mean (SD) 
Owner of habitat    
 Public (n = 25)  0.84 (0.21) 
 Private (n = 34)  0.75 (0.23) 
Business listed as threata    
 Yes (n = 36)  0.80 (0.20) 
 No (n = 23)  0.77 (0.27) 
Comments against decisionb    
 Yes (n = 22)  0.83 (0.19) 
 No (n = 37)  0.77 (0.25) 
Regional workloadc    
 Low (n = 21)  0.89 (0.16) 
  High (n = 38)   0.73 (0.24) 
Overall (n = 59)   0.79 (0.23) 
aOrganized business, resource extraction or agriculture) threatened by ESA listing. 
bNumber of public comments submitted to the FWS for each species. 
cCategorized based up on the number of decisions per region, ≤20 = Low; >20 = High. 
 
Factors influencing quality of decision 
When evaluated by regional workload, the model with the owner-LCV and public 
attention-region workload interactions explained the most variation in decision quality 
and received the most support (Table 13). Additionally, Owner-LCV score interaction 
was also in 3 of the top 5 region models (Table 13, Fig. 7). Similarly, owner-LCV score 
interaction was also an important factor explaining decision quality when evaluating 
influential factors by office workload, occurring in 2 of the top 5 models (Table 14). 
Specifically, decision quality increases for species occurring on private lands as the 
states they are in become more pro-environment (i.e., less pro land-use) and decision 
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quality decreases for species occurring on public land (Fig. 7). Decision quality is not 
affected by workload under varying public attention when workloads are low at both the 
region and office levels; however, decision quality increases dramatically as public 
attention increases in high workload regions and offices (Fig. 8). Public attention, owner 
of habitat, and workload also occur in the top models explaining variation in decision 
quality at both the region and office levels (Table 13, Table 14). However, public 
attention was the only factor that explained decision quality and was significant at both 
the region and office level (Table 15, Fig. 9).  
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Table 13. Top models fitted for factors influencing U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service decision quality for Endangered Species 
Act listing decisions by FWS region workload from 2011 – 2014.a 
            
Model k R2 AICc i   
(Owner x LCV) + (public attention x workload) 8 0.23 0.00 0.22  
Public attention + region workload  4 0.14 0.19 0.20  
Public attention + owner + workload 5 0.15 0.92 0.14  
Public attention + (owner x LCV) 6 0.16 1.71 0.09  
Public attention + workload + (owner x LCV) 7 0.18 1.99 0.08  
Owner + workload 4 0.11 2.38 0.07  
Public attention 3 0.08 2.46 0.06  
Business + (owner x LCV) + (public attention x workload) 9 0.21 2.82 0.05  
Workload 3 0.07 2.95 0.05  
Public attention + owner 4 0.10 2.98 0.05   
aAbbreviations: k, number of model parameters; R2, adjusted coefficient of determination; AICc, difference in the AICc 
between a particular model and the top-ranked model; i, probability that the model is the best for the given set of models 
and data.  
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Table 14. Top models fitted for factors influencing U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service decision quality for Endangered Species 
Act listing decisions by FWS office workload from 2011 – 2014.a 
      
Model k R2 AICc i   
Public attention + (owner x LCV) 6 0.16 0.00 0.25  
Owner + (public attention x workload) 6 0.15 0.50 0.19  
(Owner x LCV) + (public attention x workload) 8 0.19 0.96 0.15  
Public attention + owner 4 0.10 1.27 0.13  
Public attention + owner + workload 5 0.11 2.00 0.09  
Owner + LCV + (public attention x workload) 7 0.13 3.10 0.05  
(Owner x LCV)  5 0.08 3.46 0.04  
(Owner x LCV) + (public attention x workload) + (public attention x 
business) 10 0.20 3.73 0.04  
Public attention + (owner x workload) 6 0.09 4.19 0.03  
intercept only 2   4.38 0.03   
aAbbreviations: k, number of model parameters; R2, adjusted coefficient of determination; AICc, difference in the AICc 
between a particular model and the top-ranked model; i, probability that the model is the best for the given set of models 
and data.
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Figure 7. Predicted interaction of League of Conservation Voter (LCV) score and owner 
of habitat on U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service decision quality for species evaluated under 
the Endangered Species Act from 2011 – 2014.  
Figure 8. Predicted interaction of public attention and region workload U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service listing decision quality for species evaluated under the Endangered 
Species Act from 2011 – 2014. 
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Table 15. Model averaged coefficients for top models (AICc ≤ 2) evaluating U.S. Fish 
and Wildlife Service listing decision quality for species evaluated under the Endangered 
Species Act from 2011 – 2014 at the region and office level.  
 
   
90% Confidence Limits 
Parameter b SE Lower Upper 
Region     
 Public attention* 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.06 
 Owner* 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.06 
 Region workload* 0.12 0.06 0.02 0.22 
Office      
 Public attention* 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.06 
 Owner 0.08 0.06 -0.02 0.17 
  Office workload -0.01 0.01 -.02 0.00 
*Indicates significant estimated predictor variables with 90% confidence intervals that 
do not cross zero.  
 
 
 
Figure 9. Predicted mean effects (95% CI) of public attention on U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service decision quality for Endangered Species Act listing decisions made from 2011 – 
2014.  
 
 
71 
 
Discussion 
My results show that the public itself is directly influencing bureaucratic behavior and 
workload condition greatly enhances this trend with higher public attention and high 
workloads interacting to increase decision quality, likely in an attempt by bureaucrats to 
avoid negative feedback. These results support research that public attention is acting as 
a “fire alarm” to legislators (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984, Bennedsen and Feldmann 
2006) or other entities in which bureaucrats seek to avoid criticism, including their 
superiors within the agency itself (Francis et al. 2005, Meier and O'Toole 2006). Other 
explanations for the influence of public attention on decision quality may be less direct 
and more difficult to evaluate. For example, the FWS may be intentionally increasing 
public attention for particular listing decisions in an attempt either to draw attention to 
decisions in which they have applied a greater effort or to distract from the decisions 
they would prefer ignored. It is difficult to conclude if public attention is driving the 
decision quality or if the FWS is driving decision quality and public attention without 
more transparency in how ESA listing decisions are made and by whom.   
Factors influencing decision quality interacted with workload, suggesting that 
under greater resource restrictions (i.e., less time and money) bureaucrats will focus their 
resources on decisions that have higher potential negative feedback in order to avoid 
criticism (Leaver 2009, Eckerd 2014). In high workload situations, FWS biologists may 
be relying more on what has been successful for them to use in the past or what their 
peers have used rather than applying the time needed to vet the literature properly. FWS 
biologists have been shown to rely more heavily on literature that has been historically 
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successful for them to use for decision making, also known as path dependency (Pierson 
2000, Gerlach et al. 2013), in order to decrease time and effort under stretched resources. 
Gerlach et al. (2013) found that FWS biologists perceived “best available science” as the 
literature that was socially sanctioned as superlative (i.e., normative isomorphism) due to 
high numbers of collaborations between natural resource agencies, particularly other 
federal agencies. Specifically, it is easier for field offices to rely on familiar data 
resources and institutionalized processes rather than seek out new resources (Gerlach et 
al. 2013). Additionally, jurisdiction size, which could be equivalent to region size or 
volume of responsibilities, has been shown to influence sourcing of scientific literature 
used in decision-making (Francis et al. 2005), which may correlate with workload, 
reliance on outside resources, or quality of decision makers and their ability to discern 
between good and bad scientific data. 
Overall, decision quality was ~18% higher and varied less than high workload 
regions. However, other factors may be influencing differences in decision quality. For 
example, Gerlach et al. (2013) suggested that literature use behavior patterns by FWS 
biologists may diffuse on the regional scale; that is, there are similar patterns in what is 
considered “best” science within regions. Factors influencing decision quality across 
regions or offices may also be the result of variation regarding the influence of previous 
experiences on biologists or managers (Gerlach et al. 2013), institutional norms and 
practices (Wood and Waterman 1993, Egeberg 1999, Lee 2013), or values held by the 
bureaucrats themselves that may be unique to the area of the country (Meier and O'Toole 
2006). It is likely that bureaucrats at the regional level are more exposed to direct 
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political pressure than those functioning at local FWS offices simply due to the structural 
hierarchy with the FWS. It is also possible that local office bureaucrats are influenced by 
local political factors (Innes and Mitra 2015), a factor which I did not measure for my 
analyses. Local FWS offices also face varying habitats, species needs, local cultures, and 
environmental group pressures, all of which may influence decision quality more locally 
than at a regional scale but were not considered in my analyses.  
The interaction between potential political influence (i.e., LCV score) and 
ownership of habitat are difficult to explain; however, the dynamics of listing decisions 
affecting public lands are profoundly different from those affecting private lands. On 
public land, political influence and perspective may shape the public opinion of the 
purposes and uses of public lands. For example, in “pro-land” use states the majority 
opinion may be that public land is best suited for public grazing and, therefore, there is 
an increased likelihood of public scrutiny of ESA listing decisions. In contrast, ESA 
listing decisions that take place on public lands in “pro-environment” states may suffer 
less public scrutiny because the people that live there welcome the environmental 
protections. I did not find strong evidence of  potential opposing business interest on 
decision quality; however, interest groups may be playing a more complex role that is 
more difficult to discern given that they often rely on public attention to determine their 
participation or trigger it themselves (Holyoke 2003) while also considering their 
political advantages (Kollman 1998). 
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My results are not intended to suggest that decisions with better quality literature 
sources are always more accurate (i.e., protection is or is not necessary). Indeed, 
bureaucrats may be using more literature that is accepted as the “best” (e.g., peer-
reviewed journal articles) simply to justify their decisions under circumstances of higher 
scrutiny even when sufficient data is not available. Uncertainty due to lack of sufficient 
information on species’ populations and threats is prevalent throughout listing decisions 
(see Chapter 2) which may indicate that even when the “best available science” is used, 
poor decisions can still potentially be made. However, unless an effort is made to 
increase the knowledge for candidate species (e.g., funding of targeted research), even 
decisions of the highest quality will risk protecting species that do not need protection or 
not protecting those that do. Additionally, not acknowledging the uncertainty and touting 
the use of “best available science” is likely doing a disservice to the ESA itself by 
undermining its legitimacy and masking hidden discretionary bureaucratic choices 
(Doremus 1997, Woods and Morey 2008).  
There have been previous attempts to make the process of ESA listing decisions 
more scientific. For example, in an attempt to simulate the journal peer review process 
used to evaluate original research, FWS and NMFS announced in 1994 that they were 
changing their policy to include independent peer reviews with the intention of the 
reviewers to comment on the pertinent scientific and commercial data and assumptions 
included in the proposed listing (USFWS and NMFS 1994). However, the a priori 
premise that ESA listing decisions can be made using the scientific process (i.e., 
deductive rather than inductive reasoning) when there are outside forces influencing the 
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outcome of the decision may to be false (Murphy and Weiland 2016), at least under the 
current guidelines for ESA listing decisions. The variation in decision quality found in 
this study reveals that decisions are often likely biased because of (1) predisposition of 
decisions-makers towards a pre-determined outcome, (2) reliance of decision-makers on 
biased sources of information which are pre-disposed to be selected over others for 
reasons discussed above or (3) both.  
Policy Recommendations 
The majority of the literature addressing the use of science in environmental policy, 
particularly for the ESA, encourages more regulation and guidelines for those making 
the decisions so that the “best science available” is more consistent across time and 
space (Meffe et al. 1998, Francis et al. 2005, Sullivan et al. 2006). My data suggests the 
FWS, in general, is aware of what constitutes the best science and is capable of writing 
rules that use it. However, quality of the science used in ESA listing Rules declines with 
decreasing oversight and potential negative feedback to the agency, particularly when 
resources are stretched. Carroll et al. (2012) suggested a decrease in oversight is 
preferable in order to maintain continuity of “acceptable” risk of endangerment to 
species over time and strict guidelines that define acceptable risk of extinction would 
negate the need for oversight. My data suggests a decrease in oversight, which appears 
to be prompted partially by the public as a “fire alarm”, would decrease the quality of the 
decisions made under the ESA. However, this does not negate the need for consistency 
in the definition acceptable risk to species and the potential benefits of it being clearly 
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defined under the ESA (Wilhere 2008, Woods and Morey 2008), as this nebulousness 
allows agencies to manipulate their use of the literature to support the decision and not 
the other way around, a tactic used historically in the name of science (Oreskes and 
Conway 2011).  
 My results show that workload and, potentially, limited resources appear to have 
a direct influence on decision quality. It is unlikely that the general trends in species 
decline due to human population growth and resource consumption will decrease in the 
future. Therefore, it is unlikely FWS will see a decrease in petitioned species in need of 
evaluation under the ESA. If more resources, including more qualified decision-makers, 
can improve decisions quality then those resources should be allocated to overstretched 
regions and offices. Another option could be for overburdened offices to share workload 
with other, lower workload, offices. I believe that higher transparency in the decision 
making process, specifically providing information on which FWS employees are 
writing and making decisions, would provide more accountability, increase incentives to 
hire capable biologists, and improve overall quality in ESA listing decisions.  
 Finally, the presentation and layout of ESA Proposed and Final Rules need to be 
adjusted to increase transparency of what information is available for each species and, 
more importantly, what information is most heavily relied upon to make the final 
decision and why. The current layout allows decision-makers to muffle decisions by 
presenting all data, no matter how obscure, in a way that does not distinguish quality or 
reliability. This allows for the misrepresentation or incomplete presentation of science 
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and potentially places an inappropriate emphasis and reliance on information that is not 
felicitous, all impediments to quality decisions when using the “best available science” 
(Murphy and Weiland 2016). 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Previous research shows similar results and conclusions to the results found in my study 
regarding uncertainty surrounding wildlife policy decisions (Easter-Pilcher 1996, Prato 
2005, Schultz 2008), but there has been little done to address these issues in regards to 
the Endangered Species Act (ESA). Further, the lack of clarity prompted by the lack of 
objectively defined terms regarding what it means to be an endangered or threatened 
species further confounds the decision process (Rohlf 1991, Woods and Morey 2008). 
Previous research suggests that uncertainty allows for increased agency discretion 
(Schultz 2008) and uncertainty, along with the ESA “science only” mandate, appears to 
encourage the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) to conceal the true basis for their 
decisions, make their decisions appear objective and certain, and ultimately undermine 
political support by declaring that science is the ultimate foundation for their decisions 
(Doremus 1997). More transparency in listing decisions (i.e., which data is relied upon 
most to make decisions) as well as clarification of what is known or not known in 
regards to data variability and estimation error would minimize potential bias produced 
by writing rules that essentially “defend” positions a priori decisions.  
 Because of the uncertainty in the data and the lack of the requirement for 
transparency regarding which data sources FWS uses to make final listing decisions, 
there appears to be a strong influence of non-biological variables, specifically FWS 
region and ownership of habitat, on listing decisions. My research also shows that land 
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ownership (i.e., public vs. private) of habitat and FWS region have a large influence on 
likelihood of protection. These results may be an artifact of higher threat levels (e.g., 
human population size, development, invasive species) for species in regions that 
correspond with these variables. It is also possible that these differences are influenced 
by political or cultural variation within the states or regions where the species occur or 
that listing decisions are influenced by institutionalized agency norms within the FWS 
(Gerlach et al. 2013). Additionally, workload affects decision quality and, under high 
workload situations, public attention and political pressure dictate the level of rigor used 
in ESA listing decisions, likely in an attempt by bureaucrats to avoid negative feedback 
and consequences. Issues affecting decision quality undoubtedly vary by FWS region 
and so policies that address the shortcomings of the ESA would need to vary by the 
characteristics and demands of each region, including which threats are prevalent, how 
and from whom decision-makers decide which data constitutes the “best available”, and 
the resources available in the context of ESA workload.  
Specific Recommendations for Improvement in Use of “Best Available Science” 
1. Increase transparency in decisions. Modify how Proposed and Final Rules are 
written and presented by clearly reporting the shortcomings of the data available, clearly 
identifying which literature provided the largest contribution to the final decision and 
why, and identify which literature was not considered valid or appropriate and why.  
Provide a clear definition of what it means to be endangered or threatened. There will 
always be room for varying opinions on acceptable level of endangerment as long as 
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acceptable risk of extinction is not clearly defined in the ESA, which allows the FWS to 
be less transparent and less accountable for their decisions. Potential negative feedback 
may be more impactful to decision quality when accountability is higher. Be more 
transparent about who writes the Rules and makes the final decision. Accountability will 
go a long way to makes sure qualified individuals are tasked with evaluating the 
literature and determining its quality and usefulness to the decision process. 
2. Fund research before unneeded protections are put in place. When data regarding 
species population status, trends, and threats are largely unavailable, provide resources 
to researchers to fill in the gaps so listing decisions are more accurate and resources are 
not squandered on species that do not need protection. Funding for research on candidate 
species, before the financial burden of ESA protections are implemented, will increase 
decision quality and decrease Type I and Type II errors. 
3. Be more pro-active than reactive. Direct resources into programs and policies 
that address the most common threats in each region and nationally (i.e., invasive 
species, direct habitat loss and fragmentation). Addressing common threats directly 
instead of on a species-by-species basis will not only prevent further deterioration in 
populations of already protected species but also to slow the need for protections for 
potential future species of concern.  
4. Increase agency resources. Insufficient financial resources and stretched agency 
staff are leading to lower quality decisions, which likely include protecting species that 
do not need protection and not protecting those that do. If more resources, including 
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more qualified decision-makers, can improve decisions quality then those resources 
should be allocated to overstretched regions and offices. 
Limitations of Study 
The results from this dataset may have generalizability problems regarding FWS 
behavior or overall bureaucratic behavior under average circumstances. FWS does not 
typically conduct the large number of listing reviews in a short time, which was required 
by the Center for Biological Diversity vs Salazar 2011 settlement, and, therefore, regions 
and offices may not typically suffer from the lack of resources brought on by the 
extremely high workloads observed during my study. While the data offers the 
advantages of observing large numbers of bureaucratic decisions over a short period, 
thus eliminating many variables that may otherwise influence outcomes (i.e., changes in 
personnel, change of administration, shifts in public opinion), it is also possible that the 
large number of decisions over a short period may also influenced outcomes and 
behavior. For example, the perception by FWS employees of environmental group 
pressure may have been exacerbated due to the recent legal settlements thus modifying 
the way FWS operated with each species (i.e., listing species using low decisions quality 
when public attention is low in order to appease environmental groups). More research is 
needed regarding environmental group behavior and its impact on FWS behavior in 
order to understand the dynamics of their interactions under these varying conditions.  
Additionally, public attention may have been diluted for many species within my 
dataset simply because of the large number of listing decisions. It is possible that species 
in more direct conflict with human interests gained substantial enough attention to have 
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an effect on decisions quality while others did not receive the public attention they 
would normally receive. Therefore, it is possible that decision quality is normally higher 
overall under ordinary circumstances of FWS listing decisions because the average 
public attention per decisions is, on average, higher. This does not negate my finding of 
the strong influence of public attention on decision quality. However, more research is 
needed on the amount of public attention necessary to trigger a bureaucratic reaction 
under typical workloads as well as how much it varies under normal conditions to better 
understand how bureaucratic behavior and decision quality fluctuates overall.  
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APPENDIX A 
SUMMARY OF ESA LISTING DECISION BY TAXONOMIC GROUP 
 
   mean ± SD   
Taxonomic group Count EN TH PR NW 
Months 
candidate 
Months 
proposed #  threats   
Plant 40 (28.0%) 16 7 2 15 261.0 ± 162.2 12.3 ± 2.2 4 ± 1  
Terrestrial 
invertebrates 
30 (21.0%) 
8 0 6 16 146.2 ± 145.7 12.9 ± 5.1 4 ± 1  
Aquatic invertebrates 23 (16.1%) 14 3 5 1 181.5 ± 145.7 12.1 ± 1.5 5 ± 2  
Herps 18 (12.6%) 6 7 1 4 155.4 ± 118.8 13.3 ± 2.4 6 ± 2  
Fish 14 (9.8%) 5 1 1 7 156.8 ± 118.8 13.0 ± 2.4 5 ± 2  
Mammals 9 (6.3%) 2 1 2 4 123.0 ± 114.7  13.3 ± 2.3 5 ± 2  
Birds 9 (6.3%) 0 3 0 6 111.7 ± 58.3 14.7 ± 4.6 5 ± 2  
Total 143 51 22 17 53 189.2 ± 151.6  12.7 ± 2.7 5 ± 2   
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APPENDIX B 
NUMBER OF ESA LISTING DECISIONS BY STATE 
State # of species 
Texas 31 
California 26 
Arizona 21 
Nevada 16 
Alabama 14 
New Mexico 14 
Washington 13 
Kentucky 11 
Florida 10 
Tennessee 10 
Utah 10 
Arkansas 9 
Colorado 9 
Missouri 9 
Oregon 9 
Oklahoma 8 
Virginia 8 
Indiana 7 
Ohio 7 
West Virginia 7 
Illinois 6 
Pennsylvania 6 
Georgia 5 
Idaho 5 
Kansas 5 
Michigan 5 
Mississippi 5 
Montana 5 
Alaska 4 
Minnesota 4 
North Carolina 4 
Wisconsin 4 
Wyoming 4 
Puerto Rico 4 
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Iowa 3  
Louisiana 3  
New York 3  
Connecticut 2  
Delaware 2  
Hawaii 2  
Maine 2  
Maryland 2  
Massachusetts 2  
Nebraska 2  
New Hampshire 2  
New Jersey 2  
South Carolina 2  
Vermont 2  
North Dakota 1  
Rhode Island 1  
South Dakota 1  
U.S. Virgin Islands 1   
100 
APPENDIX C 
THREATS CITED IN ESA RULE AND NATURESERVE BY FWS REGION 
Region 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 All 
Agriculture 5 24 6 5 0 5 0 10 55 
45% 51% 67% 16% 0% 42% 0% 34% 38% 
Land conversion 7 20 6 27 1 2 0 14 77 
64% 43% 67% 87% 100% 17% 0% 48% 54% 
Resource use 1 14 7 8 1 5 1 10 47 
9% 30% 78% 26% 100% 42% 33% 34% 33% 
Water diversion 2 24 4 10 1 3 0 8 52 
18% 51% 44% 32% 100% 25% 0% 28% 36% 
Commercial fishing 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 3 
9% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 67% 0% 2% 
Competing uses (other) 6 8 0 4 0 3 0 17 38 
55% 17% 0% 13% 0% 25% 0% 59% 27% 
Exploitation 0 2 2 6 0 2 2 4 18 
0% 4% 22% 19% 0% 17% 67% 14% 13% 
Climate change 4 18 0 9 1 7 3 14 56 
36% 38% 0% 29% 100% 58% 100% 48% 39% 
Modified disturbance regimes 9 10 2 13 0 2 0 13 49 
82% 21% 22% 42% 0% 17% 0% 45% 34% 
Pesticides/herbicides 1 10 1 7 0 0 0 3 22 
9% 21% 11% 23% 0% 0% 0% 10% 15% 
Pollution (other) 1 12 5 8 1 0 2 1 30 
9% 26% 56% 26% 100% 0% 67% 3% 21% 
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Exotic/invasive species 9 21 7 18 1 6 0 14 76 
 82% 45% 78% 58% 100% 50% 0% 48% 53% 
Species interactions 5 7 3 8 0 2 1 5 31 
 45% 15% 33% 26% 0% 17% 33% 17% 22% 
Isolated populations 9 29 7 26 1 5 0 20 97 
 82% 62% 78% 84% 100% 42% 0% 69% 68% 
Other 1 3 1 1 0 0 0 2 8 
  9% 6% 11% 3% 0% 0% 0% 7% 6% 
Total decisions 11 47 9 31 1 12 3 29 143 
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APPENDIX D 
DECISION QUALITY BY REGION AND OFFICE 
FWS Region 
Mean ± SD 
Decision Quality by 
Region (n) 
Office State 
Mean ± SD 
Decision Quality by 
Office (n) 
1 
Pacific 
(n = 11) 
0.93 ± 0.12 (n = 7) 
Pacific Islands FWO (n = 2) Hawaii 0.85 (n = 1) 
Oregon FWO (n = 1) Oregon 1.02 (n = 1) 
Washington FWO (n = 8)* Washington 0.93 ± 0.13 (n = 5) 
2* 
Southwest 
(n = 47) 
0.70 ± 0.18 (n = 12) 
Arizona ESFO (n = 16)* Arizona 0.75 ± 0.18 (n = 2) 
New Mexico ESFO (n = 6)* New Mexico 0.75 ± 0.23 (n = 3) 
Oklahoma ESFO (n = 1) Oklahoma 0.94 (n = 1) 
Texas Coastal ESFO (n = 2) Texas 0.72 ± 0.09 (n = 2) 
Arlington Field Office (n = 2) Texas NA 
Corpus Christi ESFO (n = 2) Texas NA 
Austin Field Office (n = 18)* Texas 0.56 ± 0.16 (n = 4) 
3 
Great Lakes, Big 
Rivers (n = 9) 
0.90 ± 0.14 (n = 4) 
Rock Island Field Office (n = 1) Illinois 0.76 (n = 1) 
Illinois Field Office (n = 2) Illinois 0.90 ± 0.12 (n = 2) 
Chicago ESFO (n = 1) Illinois 
Columbia ESFO (n = 2) Missouri 1.06 (n = 1) 
Columbus ESFO (n = 2) Ohio NA 
Green Bay ESFO (n = 1) Wisconsin NA 
4* 
Southeast 
(n = 31) 
0.71 ± 0.30 (n = 15) 
Arkansas ESFO (n = 3) Arkansas 1.19 (n = 1) 
Panama City Field Office (n = 1) Florida NA 
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Florida ESFO (n = 1) Florida 0.59 (n = 1)  
South Florida ESFO (n = 8)* Florida 0.86 ± 0.44 (n = 3)  
Georgia ESFO (n = 2) Georgia 0.38 (n = 1)  
Kentucky ESFO (n = 1) Kentucky NA  
Mississippi Field Office (n = 2) Mississippi 0.77 ± 0.15 (n = 2)  
Asheville ESFO (n = 1) 
North 
Carolina 
 0.50 (n = 1) 
 
Caribbean ESFO (n = 6)* Puerto Rico 0.50 ± 0.19 (n = 4)  
Tennessee ESFO (n = 6)* Tennessee 1.01 (n = 1)   
5 
Northeast  
(n = 1) 
0.58 (n = 1) West Virginia Field Office (n = 1) 
West 
Virginia 
0.58 (n = 1) 
  
6 
Mountain Prairie 
(n = 12) 
0.88 ± 0.19 (n = 7) 
Colorado Field Office (n = 2) Colorado NA   
Montana ESFO (n = 3) Montana 0.91 (n = 1)   
Nebraska ESFO (n = 1) Nebraska 0.82 (n = 1)  
Utah ESFO (n = 5)* Utah 0.86 ± 0.11 (n = 2)  
Wyoming ESFO (n = 1) Wyoming 1.27 (n = 1)   
7 
Alaska  
(n = 3) 
0.89 ± 0.12 (n = 2) 
Juneau FWO (n = 1) Alaska NA   
Fairbanks FWO (n = 1) Alaska 0.98 (n = 1)  
Alaska Regional Office (n = 1) Alaska 0.81 (n = 1)   
8* 
Pacific Southwest 
(n =29) 
0.81 ± 0.22 (n = 11) 
Sacramento FWO (n = 7)* California 0.84 ±  0.16 (n = 6)   
Arcata FWO (n = 2) California NA  
Bay Delta FWO (n = 2) California 0.80 (n = 1)  
Ventura FWO (n = 3) California 0.85 (n = 1)  
Carlsbad FWO (n = 4) California 0.85 ± 0.49 (n = 2)  
Nevada FWO (n = 11)* Nevada 0.50 (n = 1)   
*indicates regions and offices designated as high workload.  
